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Abstract: The five thoughtful, incisive articles by Professors Bernstein,
Chamallas, Geistfeld, Moore, and Sugarman offer a breathtaking range of per-
spectives on the Restatement, Third of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons
(“ITR”). Some view tort law from the widest vantage point, inquiring whether
this forest deserves its own appellation or should instead be assimilated to the
rest of tort’s greenery. Some focus more on the trees–on the distinct doctrines
that characterize the torts and defenses that ITR is restating. In this response, we
engage with the participants at both levels.
Our response also addresses two fundamental questions–the role of a
Restatement and the significance of the “intentional tort” category. First, ITR
is a Restatement of tort law. It is not a model code of tort law, nor is it an
academic article committed to a particular vision of the proper purposes and
principles of tort law. We see our task, not as creating a grand theory from which
all of intentional tort doctrine can be deduced, but as a bottom-up endeavor,
accurately characterizing developments in the case law and then providing the
most sensible and persuasive justifications for extant doctrine. At the same time,
however, we strive to provide intellectual coherence to this body of law. Thus,
we examine not only the holdings in narrow doctrinal categories, but also the
consistency of those holdings with more general tort law principles.
Second, what is distinctive about the intentional torts to persons? How do
they differ from torts of negligence or from other intentional torts? These ques-
tions have no simple answer, because most of the intentional torts to persons
have very long historical roots, and because the common law process of refor-
mulating doctrine has played a vital role in defining the scope of these torts in
current American law. It is thus not at all surprising to find tensions and
apparent inconsistencies between some current doctrines.
Nevertheless, we believe that the contemporary formulations of these torts
are indeed justifiable in principle. First, these intentional torts sometimes reflect
a hierarchy of fault or culpability. Purposely injuring someone is more culpable,
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ceteris paribus, than negligently causing the same injury. Second, these torts
sometimes protect distinct interests, such as the interest in avoiding emotional
harm or in freedom of movement, that for various policy reasons are not
protected by liability rules if they are only negligently invaded. Third, the
intentional torts do not simply identify species of conduct that reflect greater
fault or culpability than negligence. Comparing intentional torts is sometimes
akin to comparing apples and oranges, because these torts protect a varied set of
interests or protect them in varying ways. Fourth, the intentional torts express a
pluralistic set of values and principles. No single principle (such as welfare,
autonomy, or freedom) fully explains all of these torts. And fifth, although these
intentional torts contain some reasonableness criteria, for the most part they
reject the reasonableness paradigm of negligence, and thus reject the more
flexible, less structured criteria of liability that that paradigm engenders.
Keywords: intentional tort, tort, intent, battery, assault, false imprisonment,
negligence, fault, consent, rape, sexual assault, restatement
1 Introduction
The intentional tort doctrines addressed by the Restatement, Third of Torts:
Intentional Torts to Persons (henceforth “ITR”) have received relatively little
scholarly attention, with respect either to their details or to the underlying
principles that justify them. We are very grateful to the Journal of Tort Law for
holding this symposium, which begins to fill that lacuna. And we are hopeful that
our interchange with these five thoughtful, incisive articles by Professors Anita
Bernstein, Martha Chamallas, Mark Geistfeld, Nancy Moore, and Stephen
Sugarman will trigger further scholarship about these neglected topics.
One challenge of this symposium project is that these five scholars are com-
menting upon, and critiquing, a moving target. The most recent draft that had been
completed at the time they initially drafted their commentary was Preliminary Draft
No. 4.1 Since that time, Council Draft No. 4 has been published, and we will soon
complete Preliminary Draft No. 5 and Tentative Draft No. 3. For purposes of this
symposium, we treat Preliminary Draft No. 4 as the most recent expression of our
views. The challenge of amoving target is also a welcome opportunity, however.We
will incorporate many of the very helpful suggestions from these five articles in
future drafts, including those that we are currently revising.
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS (AM. LAW INST.,
Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2017)
2 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
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We should also caution that, although we make some assertions in this
response about our plans for future drafts of ITR, it is always hazardous to
predict what the American Law Institute will approve. The approval process is
lengthy, and surprising hurdles sometimes arise. Nevertheless, we have no
doubt that the ultimate effect of this symposium will be both an improvement
in the quality of ITR and a revival of academic interest in the topics that ITR
addresses.
The five articles offer a breathtaking range of perspectives on the intentional
torts project—hence the title of this response. Some view tort law from the widest
vantage point, inquiring whether this forest deserves its own appellation or
should instead be assimilated to the rest of tort’s greenery. Some focus more
on the trees—that is, the distinct doctrines that characterize the torts and
defenses that ITR is restating.
Before turning to the specific arguments in each article, we would like to
make two introductory substantive points that have relevance to all of the
articles in this symposium, about the role of a Restatement and about the
significance of the “intentional tort” category.
First, ITR is a Restatement of tort law. It is not a model code of tort law, nor
is it an academic article committed to a particular vision of the proper purposes
and principles of tort law. But what is a Restatement? Is it a snapshot of current
precedent? An extrapolation from current trends? An endorsement of the sound-
ness of the relevant doctrine? A confirmation that a specific doctrine is consis-
tent with other doctrines and principles in the relevant area of law? The simple
answer is, “All of the above.” But the more complex and more honest answer is:
reasonable people may differ about the relative weight of these considerations,
even within the express guidelines of the ALI.2
We see our task, not as creating a grand theory from which all of intentional
tort doctrine can be deduced, but as a bottom-up endeavor, accurately charac-
terizing developments in the case law and then providing the most sensible and
persuasive justifications for extant doctrine. We look closely at what judges are
doing, and what they say about what they are doing. At the same time, however,
we strive to provide intellectual coherence to this body of law. Thus, we examine
not only the holdings in narrow doctrinal categories, but also the consistency of
those holdings with more general tort law principles.
Second, what is distinctive about the intentional torts to persons? How do
they differ from torts of negligence, or from other intentional torts? These are
foundational questions posed by most of the contributors to this symposium. No
2 The ALI’s most recent official statement about the nature of a Restatement gives weight to all
of these questions. See ALI Revised Style Manual, approved by the ALI Council, January 2015.
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simple answer to these questions is possible, for two reasons. First, most of the
intentional torts encompassed by ITR have very long historical roots. Second,
judicial precedent and the common law process of reformulating doctrine have
played vital roles in defining the scope of these torts in current American law.
The contemporary contours of these torts, and the criteria that differentiate them
from each other, from other intentional torts, and from torts of negligence and of
strict liability, reflect that common law history and evolution. It is thus not at all
surprising that there are tensions and apparent inconsistencies between some
current doctrines.3
Nevertheless, contemporary formulations of even traditional causes of
action must indeed be justifiable in principle. What, then, are the most
persuasive justifications for the intentional torts addressed by ITR, including
both the question of whether liability is warranted and whether the distinc-
tions between these torts and other torts are sensible? In our responses
below, we explore these questions in some detail. For now, we emphasize
five points.4 First, these intentional torts sometimes reflect a hierarchy of
fault or culpability. Purposely injuring someone is more culpable, ceteris
paribus, than negligently causing the same injury. Second, these torts some-
times protect distinct interests, such as the interest in avoiding emotional
harm or in freedom of movement, that for various policy reasons are not
protected by liability rules if they are only negligently invaded. Third, the
intentional torts do not simply identify species of conduct that reflect greater
fault or culpability than negligence. That is, comparing intentional torts is
sometimes akin to comparing apples and oranges, because these torts protect
a varied set of interests or protect them in varying ways. Fourth, the inten-
tional torts express a pluralistic set of values and principles.5 No single
principle (such as welfare, autonomy, or freedom) fully explains all of these
torts. And fifth, although these intentional torts contain some reasonableness
criteria, for the most part they reject the reasonableness paradigm of negli-
gence, and thus reject the more flexible, less structured criterion of liability
that that paradigm engenders.
3 For a recent exploration of these points, see JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY,
RECOGNIZING WRONGS, Chapter 8 (forthcoming 2018) (explaining the “elucidative” nature of tort
adjudication).
4 Much of the remainder of this paragraph is drawn from Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement
(Third) of Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061 (2006).
5 See Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OXF. J. OF LEG. STUD. 533 (2000) (“[T]he normative
pluralism of tort law makes the project of discovering or generating a general principle of
liability for intention difficult and undesirable.”)
4 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
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We now turn to an examination of the five individual contributions to this
symposium.
2 Reply to Geistfeld
2.1 Introduction
In his illuminating and insightful article, “Conceptualizing the Intentional
Torts,” Mark Geistfeld perceptively identifies an important and surprisingly
understudied question about intentional torts: why does the presence of intent
mark out a distinct category of torts?
Geistfeld observes that intentional tort doctrine cannot be fully explained and
justified by (what one of the Reporters elsewhere has called6) a fault hierarchy. It
is not the case that intentional torts invariably involve more culpable or more
faulty conduct than torts of negligence or strict liability. For example–our exam-
ple, not Geistfeld’s–a practical joker who intentionally sprays a stranger with a
water gun may be merely negligent in exceeding the scope of another’s consent
yet will be liable for battery, but a driver who intentionally exceeds the speed limit
by 50m.p.h. loses control of the car and kills a victim is liable only for negligence.
Similarly, he claims, intentional tort doctrine cannot be distinguished as a tort
category on the basis of the kinds of interests that are protected, including the
interests in emotional and physical security, autonomy, dignity and freedom of
movement. Geistfeld accurately observes that ITR frequently does rely on this type
of justification, but he objects that such interest analysis is inadequately devel-
oped, because it could equally justify negligence or strict liability.
We agree with Geistfeld in part. It is indeed the case that some of the
interests that support some intentional tort doctrines also justify negligence
doctrines. The clearest example is the interest in bodily security against physical
harm: negligence law provides general protection against unreasonably danger-
ous conduct that causes bodily harm, but harmful battery also provides protec-
tion against conduct that causes such harm. However, other interests protected
by intentional torts to persons are not protected at all, or are protected in a much
more limited way, by negligence and strict liability doctrine. False imprison-
ment, assault, offensive battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
are all examples.
6 Simons, supra note 4.
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Geistfeld is also concerned that (what he perceives as) a failure to provide an
adequate rationale for the distinctiveness of intentional torts leaves courts and
commentators unable to explain the actual doctrinal shape of intentional torts,
especially the definition of intent. In his view, the guidance offered by ITR is
helpful but incomplete.
Before offering a reply to this critique, it will be helpful to address
Geistfeld’s own account of the distinguishing characteristics of intentional
torts, an account that takes up most of his paper.
2.2 Geistfeld’s aggressive interaction conception
of intentional torts
Geistfeld asserts that the function of a Restatement is not to endorse any
particular theoretical or policy perspective, such as efficiency or fairness, in
light of disagreement about this question. We largely agree: a Restatement
should indeed be modest about selecting any particular theoretical or policy
perspective as providing the only, or the best, justification for tort doctrine. But
Geistfeld then makes a most intriguing and quite original claim: the nature of
the social interaction between plaintiff and defendant is the key to identifying
the conduct that is best analyzed as an intentional tort rather than a tort of
negligence. Specifically, he claims that three paradigmatic forms of social inter-
action shaped the common law of tort, contract and criminal law: (1) aggressive
interaction, in which the attacker takes something belonging to the victim;
(2) mutual advantage, in which the parties voluntarily participate in an interac-
tion for mutual benefit; and (3) accidental injury, a paradigm comprising
“[i]ndividuals engaged in nonaggressive risky behaviors who are not otherwise
cooperating for reasons of expected mutual benefit.” Today, he argues, intentional
torts and criminal law exemplify (1), contract and some of tort law exemplify (2),
and tort law distinctively exemplifies (3) through negligence doctrine.
Geistfeld’s argument is novel, and it illuminates some aspects of tort doc-
trine. In the end, however, we believe that his tripartite interaction-based
account oversimplifies intentional tort doctrine and relies heavily upon a slip-
pery conception of “aggression” that needs further clarification. Moreover, the
justification for employing the tripartite framework itself as a criterion of doc-
trinal categories within tort law remains elusive.
Consider, first, Geistfeld’s claim that intentional tort doctrine expresses the
category of “aggressive interactions.” He is careful not to treat this category as
simply an instance of highly culpable conduct, conduct of the sort that would be
punished as a serious crime. Instead, he emphasizes that tort law addresses the
6 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
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interaction between aggressor and victim. What is critical, he says, is whether
the actor intends to invade the protected interests of the victim, and how the
victim would reasonably be expected to respond if aware of the actor’s conduct.
Geistfeld gives the example of actor A taking B’s umbrella based on a mistaken
belief that it is A’s, conduct that is not culpable but justifies B in perceiving the
conduct as aggressive and in employing self-help measures for that reason. “The
manner in which we interact—created both by my nonculpable taking of the
umbrella, and by your reasonable motivation to avoid that outcome by retaining
your umbrella—makes the interaction aggressive.”
This analysis is problematic, however, because it seems to define “aggres-
sion” in a Pickwickian, stipulative way. In what respect is mistaken actor A an
“aggressor” as that term is ordinarily understood? Geistfeld’s example does not
even specify that A’s mistake is unreasonable. Nor is it clear that B would
perceive A as an aggressor, especially if B recognizes that A was mistaken. To
be sure, a term might be used in a specialized sense. Perhaps Geistfeld under-
stands “aggression” to mean something like “any unjustified invasion of the
interests of another.” But on that interpretation, the connection that Geistfeld
seeks with the historical and psychological notions of aggressive interaction is
lost. Or perhaps he believes that “aggression” is equivalent to an intentional and
unjustified invasion. But that construction does not explain the example: mis-
taken actor A has no idea that he has invaded B’s property interests. His act of
taking the umbrella is intentional, to be sure, but it is unclear why the inten-
tionality of that act alone should be considered sufficient, when other inten-
tional torts require a more robust type of intentionality—such as the intention to
physically contact or to confine the plaintiff.7
We do agree that intentional torts require that the actor intend to invade the
interests of the victim in some sense. In the first Restatement of Torts, Professor
Francis Bohlen emphasized the idea that the intentional invasion of interests is
what distinguishes the intentional torts from torts of negligence and strict
liability. Prosser, in the Second Restatement of Torts, adopted a similar general
conception of intentional torts. But it is difficult to see what the concept of
“aggression” adds to the analysis.
Moreover, even if “aggression” did play a useful explanatory role, the
question would remain whether and why this paradigm of social interaction
justifies the distinct category of intentional torts. Geistfeld suggests that correc-
tive justice supports the focus on aggressive interactions because “[t]he injurious
interactions that are corrected or reversed by the intentional torts are
7 We do not deny that the intention required in trespass differs from, and is less culpable than,
that required in other intentional torts such as battery and false imprisonment.
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normatively different from those that are redressed by the rules of negligence
and strict liability.” But this begs the question of why aggression makes the right
kind of normative difference. He also suggests that efficiency can support the
focus on aggression because, instead of engaging in an aggressive interaction,
the parties could engage in a much more efficient voluntary exchange. But it
seems to us that the ability of the parties to interact and conduct a voluntary
exchange, not the aggressive nature of the interaction, is what best explains why
aggressive interactions are especially inefficient. (Indeed, in many cases of
aggression, especially sudden outbreaks of violence in highly emotional circum-
stances, it is not very plausible that legal rules could effectively induce the
parties to come to a voluntary agreement.)
Another difficulty raised by the tripartite paradigm approach relates to
Geistfeld’s surprisingly narrow understanding of “intention” as embracing pur-
pose but not knowledge. In explaining how the aggressive interaction paradigm
differs from the accidental harm paradigm, Geistfeld relies in part upon the
doctrine of double effect (DDE). Under DDE, it is much easier to justify know-
ingly or foreseeably causing a harm than to justify purposely causing the same
harm; moreover, purposely causing harm is more culpable than knowingly
doing so. Geistfeld concedes that the greater culpability of purposeful harm
cannot fully explain the intentional tort category (as in the mistaken umbrella
thief example). Yet he still concludes that the normative difference for the right-
holder that DDE identifies explains why intentional torts differ from tort rules
governing accidental, i. e., negligent, injuries. Geistfeld again invokes the mis-
taken umbrella thief, asserting that the victim in that example suffers the same
normative harm as would exist in a case of theft, involving a direct harm.
This argument is not persuasive. First, it is not clear why a mistaken
appropriation of an umbrella is a “direct” rather than “indirect” harm, since
these terms are never defined. Second, DDE does not rely on such a distinction;
rather, it draws a line between intentional or purposeful consequences on one
hand and known or foreseen consequences on the other.8 Third, in relying on
DDE, the analysis ignores an important doctrinal datum: for most intentional
torts, either purpose or knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the “intent” or “inten-
tion” requirement, as Section 1 of Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm provides. In battery, assault, and false imprisonment, the
8 Geistfeld seems to treat direct harms as equivalent to harms that the actor has the purpose to
cause, and to treat indirect harms as harms the actor merely causes knowingly or foreseeably,
but this conflates two distinct distinctions. For example, if D pays E to kill F, D has purposely
caused the death, but the intervening agency of E might be viewed as making the death of F an
indirect rather than direct consequence of D’s actions.
8 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
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actor possesses the requisite intention (to contact, to cause anticipation of a
contact, or to confine) if he has the purpose to cause the relevant consequence
but also if he knows with substantial certainty that that consequence will occur.9
The same is true of the intent for trespass to land or to chattels. For example, if D
locks the door of a room in order to keep X out of the room, knowing that Y is
inside the room and now unable to exit, D is prima facie liable for false
imprisonment of Y, even though D merely knows that his conduct will confine
Y and does not act for that purpose. Only the tort of purposeful infliction of
bodily harm is consistent with DDE in premising liability on purposely causing a
consequence rather than knowingly doing so.
Later in the article, Geistfeld does recognize that both purpose and substan-
tially certain knowledge usually suffice to satisfy an intent requirement, and
claims that his model can explain this. He argues that knowingly (but not
purposely) invading a right is still an “instrumental aggression”: D’s goal is
not to invade the right, but achieving the goal necessarily invades the right. This
is less culpable than having a goal of invading the right, but a plaintiff will still
reasonably perceive the interaction to be aggressive.
The argument is stated abstractly, but a consideration of concrete examples
demonstrates its inadequacy. Geistfeld’s argument makes sense when the knowing
invasion of the right is ameans to the actor’s goal. If a deranged scientist punches a
stranger in the head in order to study the physics of imposing that type of force on a
human head, he clearly has the requisite intent for battery—though this is better
characterized as purposely causing a physical contact, and not merely knowingly
doing so. One can purposely bring about a consequence as a means (and this fits
the “instrumental” label that Geistfeld attaches), and not as a final or ultimate end.
9 Geistfeld cites Arthur Ripstein’s account of corrective justice in his recent book in support of
his argument. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS (). However, insofar as that account
relies upon the wrongfulness of dominating or using another person, Ripstein’s view is subject
to the criticism that it cannot explain why intentionally touching a person does not always
suffice for battery, as where an actor touches another on the shoulder to request attention or
slightly bumps against others in order to exit a crowded location. See Scott Hershovitz, The
Search for a Grand Unified Theory of Tort Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 942, 949–952 (2017). Moreover,
on Ripstein’s theory, it would seem that purposely contacting a person would be an impermis-
sible battery while knowingly contacting the person ordinarily would not, since a knowing
interference with a person’s rights that is a mere side effect of the actor’s purposes is not readily
conceptualized as an impermissible using. Yet either circumstance supports battery liability. For
example, suppose a police officer jumps onto a bank robber’s car in order to prevent his escape.
The robber intentionally makes a sharp turn in order to throw the police officer off the car and
facilitate his escape, but not in order to cause physical harm to the officer. Nevertheless, the
robber’s substantially certain knowledge that his conduct will cause the officer to contact the
ground (and to suffer harm) suffices for battery liability.
Restating the Intentional Torts to Persons 9
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The hit man’s ultimate purpose is to make money, but in choosing to kill as a
means, he kills with purpose, not merely knowledge. However, Geistfeld’s argu-
ment does not make sense of the more typical case in which substantially certain
knowledge is invoked in tort law—namely, a case in which the consequence is a
side effect of the defendant’s chosen conduct, not a means or end. The locked room
example above is an illustration. Here, the notion of “instrumental aggression”
does not apply: D does not use Y as an instrument of his purposes. Rather, he
knowingly invades Y’s interest in freedom from confinement. That is, and should
be, sufficient for liability, yet Geistfeld’s model does not explain this result.
Another difficulty with Geistfeld’s tripartite paradigm is its weak fit with the
intentional torts covered by ITR. Medical batteries, for example, involve patients
and medical practitioners who seek a mutually beneficial interaction, yet tort
law ordinarily considers medical treatments beyond the scope of the patient’s
consent as intentional torts, which, for Geistfeld, reflect the paradigm of aggres-
sive interaction, not mutual benefit. Similarly, when defendant plays a practical
joke on plaintiff, defendant is often operating on the assumption that the
plaintiff will enjoy the joke, but if defendant’s conduct is beyond the scope of
the plaintiff’s consent, and if defendant should so realize, then this, too, is
treated as an intentional tort, even though mutual benefit again seems to be
the most pertinent paradigm.
2.3 Two doctrinal problems
Notwithstanding our criticisms of the tripartite paradigm structure, it is worth
examining more closely two doctrinal implications that Geistfeld draws from his
analysis. As we shall see, Geistfeld identifies some genuinely difficult doctrinal
problems that any approach to intentional torts must address. But we are not
convinced that the tripartite model provides a persuasive solution.
2.3.1 Statistical knowledge
First, Geistfeld addresses the problem of statistical knowledge. A soda manu-
facturer sends its beverages to millions of consumers. Even with reasonable
care, it knows that some of its bottles will have flaws that result in explosions
and injuries to consumers. The Restatement, Third: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm § 1, comment e suggests that this is insufficient for intentional
tort liability, because the substantial-certainty test must be limited to cases
10 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
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where the defendant’s knowledge is more individualized.10 But Geistfeld offers a
persuasive counterexample.11 Suppose a manufacturer (M1) identifies a particular
bottle that contains a defect that the manufacturer knows will result in explosion
when opened by a consumer yet sends the bottle into the marketplace. The
manufacturer should be liable for a battery, notwithstanding its lack of knowledge
of which particular consumer will be harmed, just as a person who shoots a bullet
into a small crowd is liable for a battery, despite not knowing who will be harmed.
We agree with this basic analysis. Indeed, it would also be plausible to
conclude that any manufacturer that sends such a seriously flawed product into
the stream of commerce rather than destroying it is very likely to have the
purpose to cause harm. The Restatement Third comment is inadequate in not
accounting for this type of counterexample.12
However, we do not believe that Geistfeld’s model explains this result.
Geistfeld’s explanation is as follows: an “aggressive interaction” occurs when
a manufacturer sends out a particular flawed bottle, knowing that in an indivi-
dual interaction with that bottle, a consumer will suffer harm; but no “aggres-
sion” occurs when a manufacturer (M2) sends out a large number of bottles, all
of which have a very small chance of exploding. Unfortunately, this explanation
is inadequate: it does not reveal why M1’s conduct is more “aggressive” than
M2’s. Both M1 and M2 are sending out a product knowing that it will result in
injury. Why does knowledge of which particular bottle will cause the injury
make M1’s conduct more aggressive? A more plausible explanation, we believe,
is that M1 has no socially acceptable reason for distributing (rather than
10 The comment suggests that the substantially certain knowledge test should be “limited to
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the conduct will
bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class of potential victims
within a localized area.”
11 For two similar but more extreme counterexamples in which intentional tort liability should
unquestionably exist despite lack of individualized knowledge, see Kenneth W. Simons,
Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10, 54 (2012):
Time Bomb
A terrorist plants a bomb in a central train station. He knows that the bomb is constructed
in such a way that it will explode at an indeterminate time in the near future, indiscrimi-
nately wounding or killing many individuals who happen to pass by.
…
Atmospheric Poison
A terrorist sends into the atmosphere a specially-designed chemical that he knows is
virtually certain to randomly kill a hundred people somewhere on Earth sometime in the
next hundred years.
12 See also id. at 46–59 (reaching a similar conclusion).
Restating the Intentional Torts to Persons 11
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discarding) the flawed bottle.13 By contrast, M2 may act entirely without fault in
distributing carbonated beverages to consumers, because each consumer
receives a reasonable package of benefit and risk—namely, the benefit of carbo-
nation coupled with an inevitable, very small risk of injury from explosion, a
risk that cannot be prevented by reasonable-cost inspections.14
2.3.2 Single intent
Second, Geistfeld raises some provocative and important questions about ITR’s
endorsement of single intent (intent to contact) over dual intent (intent to
contact plus intent to harm or offend) as the requisite intent for battery. He
points out that when a doctor fails to obtain the informed consent of a patient
to a medical treatment, by not disclosing the material risks and benefits of that
treatment, courts typically analyze the failure within the rubric of negligence,
not battery. (Indeed, the duty to obtain informed consent may require the
disclosure of even low-level risks of 1% or less.). But, Geistfeld claims, inade-
quate disclosure of risks and benefits also amounts to a failure to obtain
consent to the treatment. This is true, he continues, even if that inadequacy
is inadvertent rather than knowing. And under single intent (requiring only
intent to contact, not intent to harm or offend), the doctor should logically be
liable for a battery as well.15 Insofar as the law does not follow this logical
implication of the single intent approach, Geistfeld concludes, the approach is
subject to question.
One response to Geistfeld’s argument is to deny that failure to disclose the
material risks and benefits of medical treatment is sufficient to count as lack of
consent to the treatment for purposes of battery. After all, if the patient is not
13 If M1 somehow knows that one of its million bottles has a flaw but does not know which one,
then its epistemic position and ability to prevent the harm are no greater than M2. (Suppose M1
receives a credible text from a disgruntled employee that he created a flaw in one bottle but has
no way to determine the employee’s location.) In this case, M1 should be treated like M2, i. e., it
should not be treated as an intentional tortfeasor if it ships the million bottles.
14 Even if M2 was negligent in not inspecting carefully enough for flaws, M2 should not be
considered an intentional tortfeasor just because inadequate inspections will predictably result
in a certain number of injuries.
Of course, strict liability for a manufacturing defect is a widely accepted basis for imposing
liability on M2 for exploding soda bottles, but the question before us is whether battery liability
is appropriate.
15 The point that failure to obtain informed consent might logically be treated as a battery,
under single intent, is noted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO
PERSONS § 15, Reporters’ Note, cmt f (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 4, 2017).
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misled about the physical nature of the treatment, the patient’s right to control
access to his body has not been directly violated. Compare the following non-
medical case in which the material risks and benefits of a physical contact are
not disclosed. Suppose X suggests to Y an arm-wrestling match, not disclosing
that X is the world champion at the event who has occasionally injured his
opponents in the process of wrestling according to the understood rules.
Although it would be material to Y (and to just about anyone else in Y’s position)
to know these facts, X does not have a duty to obtain Y’s informed consent to the
risks, on pain of battery liability. Informed consent is a distinct doctrine attach-
ing to the professional obligations of medical practitioners, not a general duty
that obtains between all individuals who intentionally touch another.
To be sure, when the risks of physical injury are especially significant, a
failure to disclose them might indeed vitiate consent, both within and outside
the medical treatment context. If A knows that he has an STD and fails to
disclose this to a sexual partner, the partner may sue for battery if he or she
contracts the STD. But actors do not have a general duty, in all cases, to disclose
relatively small risks of physical injury of which the other is unaware. In this
regard, the obligation of medical practitioners is especially stringent. More
generally, outside of specialized contexts, individuals do not invariably expose
themselves to battery liability by failing to disclose information that they know
is highly material to another. Suppose P asks Q if Q is married, or if Q loves P,
and Q lies in response in order to sleep with P; Q’s behavior may be deplorable
but almost all courts would find it insufficient for battery.16
Geistfeld would nevertheless recognize battery liability in some medical
treatment cases—when the doctor knows that he or she is violating the patient’s
right to make an informed decision about the treatment. But it is unclear what
this proposal embraces. If it includes cases where the doctor merely knows that
he has not provided sufficient information about the material risks of the
treatment, then this test recognizes battery liability much more broadly than
current law and ITR. If it only includes cases where the doctor knows that he has
exceeded the physical scope of the consent that the patient has given, then it
would narrow battery liability relative to ITR’s single intent approach.
Geistfeld also objects that the single intent rule inappropriately results in
liability for interactions that are not “aggressive.” Once again, this objection is
difficult to assess, in light of the indistinct contours of that category. Consider, for
example, the sexual boor who unreasonably assumes that a stranger will welcome
his sudden, unilateral, forceful kiss. In the ordinary sense of the term, such
16 But not all courts. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994), upholding battery liability in
this circumstance. No cases have been found that agree with Neal.
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conduct is “aggressive.” Note, too, that the dual intent approach cannot readily
explain liability in such a case: the boor does not intend to offend or cause harm.
A further problem that Geistfeld believes the single intent approach raises
arises in the product liability context. Here, Geistfeld astutely identifies a poten-
tially serious difficulty. When a manufacturer distributes a product, Geistfeld
argues, it intends that the consumer use it, an intent that satisfies single intent.
If the manufacturer provides an inadequate warning, however, then under the
single intent approach, we must conclude that all cases in which the user of a
product is harmed because of a defective warning are batteries! If correct, this
argument would dramatically widen the scope of battery liability.
Fortunately, the argument is not correct, both for the reasons stated above
regarding product defects and for an additional reason.17 Inadequate warnings
about product dangers are quite analogous to inadequate information about
risks of medical treatment: they are much better analyzed under the more
flexible and capacious standards of negligence (or under products liability
standards that are themselves similar to negligence in these respects) than
under the more inflexible, categorical rules of intentional tort doctrine, which
are designed to apply in a more straightforward, more mechanical way.
Geistfeld’s own thoughtful answer to the puzzles that he has so nicely
formulated is not to insist on dual intent in all cases. Rather, he largely endorses
single intent but also relies upon the objective definition of offensive contact as
a contact that offends a reasonable sense of dignity. Thus, he avoids some
unpalatable consequences that would flow from the dual intent approach—for
example, allowing a doctor to subject a patient to unwanted treatment simply
because the doctor honestly believes the treatment is in the patient’s
best interests. Such treatment offends a reasonable sense of dignity, Geistfeld
notes, even if the physician does not subjectively intend to offend the patient.18
So far, so good. However, Geistfeld’s reliance on an objective criterion of
“offense” only addresses part of the problem. Even if a nonconsensual contact
is not offensive, it might cause bodily harm, and indeed this will very often
occur in medical treatment cases. Courts must then still determine whether the
single intent to contact is sufficient for liability. In our view, the answer is yes. A
17 Geistfeld seems to agree that the argument fails: “A manufacturer that intentionally violates
the consumer’s right to make an informed decision about product use only creates a risk of
physical harm, and so the occurrence of such harm is accidental and not subject to battery
liability” (footnote 100). But it is not clear why, despite this reasoning, Geistfeld reaches a
different conclusion and supports battery liability when a doctor intentionally violates a
patient’s right to make an informed decision.
18 Geistfeld also asserts that the plaintiff in such a case would reasonably perceive the
interaction to be “aggressive”—an assertion that once again seems ipse dixit.
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negative answer would make it extremely difficult to explain many of the
medical treatment cases in which a court upholds liability for battery because
a doctor or nurse exceeded the scope of consent.
2.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, we return to Geistfeld’s critique that ITR does not adequately explain
the definition of intent contained in the different intentional torts. We demur. These
definitions take their shape from the specific principles, policies, and history of
each intentional tort, as well as the administrative concerns that each tort engen-
ders. As we note in the introduction to this response, these doctrinal criteria cannot
be explained by a simple deduction from abstract principles. Moreover, “inten-
tional” torts embrace a wide range of specific tort doctrines. ITR addresses only
battery, assault, and false imprisonment.19 Other intentional torts include defama-
tion and invasion of privacy, many torts for economic harm, malicious prosecution
and abuse of process, trespass to land and chattels, and conversion.
Finally, we must not lose sight of the complexity of intent as a criterion of
liability. Intent can mean purpose, or knowledge, or both; it might even extend to
recklessness.20 Moreover, the object of intent can be specified in multiple ways.
Prosser famously defined intent as “an intent to bring about a result which will
invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction,” a
definition that is vacuous and close to circular.21 Each intentional tort particu-
larizes the relevant object of the intent, and the resulting diversity reflects the
distinctive interests protected by the tort, the distinctive type and degree of
culpability or fault that the tort requires, and also the tort’s peculiar history.
3 Reply to Sugarman
3.1 Introduction
In his strikingly original article, “Restating the Tort of Battery,” Professor
Sugarman proposes doing away with the intentional tort of battery and
19 ITR also recognizes a new tort, purposeful infliction of bodily harm, and is expected to cover
fraud causing bodily harm.
20 For example, the tort of intentional infliction of severe emotional harm extends to reckless
infliction of such harm. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (AM. LAW INST., 2010).
21 See Keith N. Hylton, Intent in Tort Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1217, 1217 (2010).
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absorbing it within a broader tort of wrongfully causing physical harm.
Although not nearly as far-reaching as his earlier proposal to do away with
tort law altogether,22 this new proposal would dramatically reshape tort doc-
trine. Sugarman concedes that he does not expect the ALI to adopt his proposal,
since it cannot reasonably be characterized as a “restatement” of the law. But he
does express hope that judges will find his approach attractive and will “over
time begin to move in my direction.”
Sugarman’s article is full of thoughtful observations about current doctrine,
and many of his criticisms of that doctrine have bite. However, we believe that
he understates the value of the current distinction between negligence and
intentional torts. Employing his suggested wrongfulness test to replace the
more differentiated intentional tort doctrines would obscure important features
of the tort landscape—indeed, it would flatten that landscape into a simple, and
unfortunately simplistic, test of wrongfulness or unreasonableness. A global test
of this sort might initially seem attractive.23 Who could object to a criterion of
legal liability that merely asks whether the actor’s conduct was unreasonable?
And, to a significant extent, negligence law employs such a test. But this is not
an appropriate test for intentional torts, as our arguments below explain.24
We agree with one of Sugarman’s arguments, that eliminating the distinc-
tion between negligence and battery causing physical harm would simplify tort
doctrine. Obviously enough, eliminating a doctrinal distinction creates one less
headache for legal actors who need to draw that distinction. But simplicity is not
always a decisive consideration in articulating the rules of tort law, as we shall
see.
In some cases, Sugarman’s approach would likely achieve different results
than the current approach. In others, although his approach might well achieve
the same legal result, it gives a less persuasive rationale for the result. So the
ultimate question is whether, in a sufficient number of cases, his approach
either achieves better results or explains the results more persuasively than
the current approach. After carefully examining his arguments and examples,
we conclude that the answer is negative.
22 Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985).
23 See George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985) (critiquing
the American legal tradition for emphasizing “the reasonable” to the exclusion of “the right”).
24 A recent, illuminating review of Sugarman’s article notes that German law provides some
support for his proposal to treat both negligence and intentional conduct that causes physical
harm within the single rubric of “Wrongfulness,” but also expresses concern that his proposal
neglects tort law’s ambition to protect rights. Anthony Sebok, Doing Away With Battery Law,
JOTWELL (20 December 2017), https://torts.jotwell.com/doing-away-with-battery-law/.
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3.2 The claim that a single principle explains harmful battery
and negligence law
In support of his general claim that harmful battery should be treated as a mere
subcategory of a single tort, Sugarman makes a number of distinct points deser-
ving a response. First, Sugarman concedes that batteries in which the actor
intends a physical harm often involve conduct that is morally more wrongful
than negligent conduct that causes physical harm. His retort is, “So what?” After
all, the same legal remedy of compensatory damages will be awarded in both
cases. And as he notes, the availability of punitive damages does not turn on the
presence or absence of an intent sufficient for battery liability. He is quite right
that judges and academics should not overstate the significance of the classifica-
tion of conduct as intentional or negligent. However, there are other ways in
which the classification matters, as we shall explain below.
Second, Sugarman emphasizes that satisfying the intent requirement for
battery is insufficient for legal liability. Liability also depends on the absence
of consent and on the absence of a justifying privilege such as self-defense.
Moreover, when the law articulates the scope of privileges, it often rejects
liability even if the actor is mistaken about the justifying facts (for example,
about whether plaintiff was actually threatening force), so long as that mistake
is reasonable. From these valid points, Sugarman draws the apparently innoc-
uous conclusion that fault—in the sense of wrongful conduct, or socially unac-
ceptable behavior, or unreasonable behavior, or conduct that violates
community standards—is the foundational criterion of battery liability.
But the conclusion is not innocuous, and it does not follow from the
premises. The fact that “reasonableness” is one part of a legal criterion does
not demonstrate that it is the only criterion. Self-defense law, for example, does
not simply permit the use of “reasonable” force to prevent the aggressor from
harming the actor. Instead, it specifies rules of proportionality and necessity.
Offensive battery contains, as part of its definition, the requirement that a
physical touching be “offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity.” But the tort
contains other requirements, including the requirement of an intentional touch-
ing. Reasonableness criteria are plentiful in tort law, but it hardly follows that
every tort standard reduces to whether the actor (or the victim) acted reasonably.
Third, one instance where the reductive approach fails is a battery in the
course of medical treatment. Sugarman does note, correctly, that some medical
batteries are also viable claims of medical malpractice for which negligence
recovery might be obtained, such as when the doctor carelessly removes the
wrong leg during a surgery. But other medical batteries are not. If Dr B
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substitutes for the original Dr A even though the patient insisted that A should
conduct the surgery, and if there is no evidence that the patient gave advance
consent to a replacement of surgeons, the patient has a valid claim of battery for
such so-called “ghost” surgery, even though many jurisdictions would not
characterize this as a case of medical malpractice by B, especially if B was
unaware of A’s contrary desires. Similarly, if a patient insists that her doctor not
use a particular medication or technique that is well within customary and
reasonable medical practice, or even that is clearly the best option from a
medical perspective, the doctor must respect the patient’s wishes either by
omitting the medication or technique or by refusing to conform to the patient’s
conditions and thus declining to treat the patient at all on that basis.
Fourth, Sugarman believes that the necessity doctrine is best explained by his
simple wrongfulness criterion. He produces a memorable example: a tiger is chas-
ing a bicycle rider who is carrying a child; both will die unless the rider pushes the
child off the bicycle, expecting the child to be eaten but thereby facilitating the
rider’s escape.25 This is a difficult case that might or might not be deemed a battery,
Sugarman notes, depending on how the jurisdiction interprets the necessity
defense. Yet, he claims, that interpretation will ultimately turn on wrongfulness.
We disagree with this analysis. To be sure, necessity criteria are somewhat
vague.26 Nevertheless, necessity criteria do not boil down to a simple question of
25 The example is somewhat comparable to the following famous example from Boorse and
Sorenson, which has entered popular culture:
A ferocious and hungry grizzly bear charges out of the woods towards both of us, although
I am closer to him. I jump into my running shoes. You shout at me, ‘‘fool, you can’t outrun
a grizzly.’’ I shout back as I take off, ‘‘I only have to outrun you.’’
Michael Moore, Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist Justifications, 27 LAW &
PHILOS. 35, 73 (2007).
26 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(1) (AM. LAW INST., 1965):
One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to
(a) the actor, or his land or chattels, or
(b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, unless the actor knows or
has reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall
take such action.
The following provision would most likely apply to Sugarman’s tiger hypothetical:
The intentional infliction upon another of substantial bodily harm, or of a confinement
involving substantial pecuniary loss, for the purpose of protecting the actor from a threat of
18 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
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whether (in Sugarman’s words) the conduct was “socially unacceptable under
the circumstances.” Notice that Sugarman’s example is a difficult one only
because intentionally causing serious harm to another is presumptively extre-
mely difficult to justify, even if a life would be saved by doing so—in other
words, even if the behavior might be justified as reasonable. Thus, the char-
acterization of the tort as an intentional wrong is crucial to the conclusion that a
justification for committing the tort must be especially compelling.
To underscore the point, compare two cases. In the first, a passenger in A’s
car suddenly suffers a heart attack, and A drives at high speed to the hospital,
endangering pedestrians on the sidewalk. In the second, driver B confronts the
same emergency, and is faced with several pedestrians crossing in front of him;
he chooses to drive through the group of pedestrians in order to arrive at the
hospital more quickly. The second driver will have a much more difficult time
justifying his conduct because he is committing an intentional tort, by know-
ingly contacting and injuring the pedestrians.27
Fifth, Sugarman discusses the question whether consent to criminal activity
such as a brawl should preclude liability. He prefers the minority rule, that such
consent is not legally effective, because the defendant’s conduct, insofar as it
violates the criminal law, is “wrongful.” Once again, this analysis ignores
relevant distinctions—in this case, between conduct that is morally wrongful,
that is criminal, or that is tortious. Conduct is often considered “wrongful” for
purposes of the criminal law but not for purposes of tort law. Prostitution is
illegal, but if the prostitute genuinely consents to sex with D in exchange for
money,28 most courts would preclude tort liability, even if P suffered minor,
foreseeable physical harm from the intercourse. Indeed, Sugarman’s argument,
if taken literally, would drastically expand tort liability. In most instances,
intentional batteries are crimes as well as torts. This argument suggests the
harm or confinement not caused by the conduct of the other, is not privileged when the
harm threatened to the actor is not disproportionately greater than the harm to the other.
Id. at § 73.
27 Sugarman also addresses a case of duress in which X threatens D with death unless he kills
an innocent person. In this case, too, he would simply ask whether submitting to the coercion is
socially unacceptable. A more careful, structured analysis would ask whether, in such a case, D
is excused from committing a wrong that clearly does not satisfy the necessity criterion of
bringing about a lesser harm or evil. The analysis would undoubtedly answer in the negative,
because tort law, although it recognizes such justifications as self-defense and necessity,
generally does not recognize excuses. See John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CAL.
L. REV. 467 (2015).
28 Assume that the prostitute is neither underage nor the victim of coercion by the customer or
by others.
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implausible conclusion that because the defendant has committed a crime,
consent to the battery is vitiated for tort purposes, permitting tort liability.
Sugarman also observes that the Restatement rule precluding liability in
“consent to crime” cases recognizes an exception when the purpose of the law
was to protect a class of people including the victim. An example is statutory
rape, forbidding adults from having sex with underage individuals. Sugarman
reasons that this exception supports his general principle imposing liability for
socially unacceptable conduct. But we believe that the exception expresses a
much narrower principle: if the legislature determines that a class of people
lacks adequate capacity to consent, a person within the class should not be
precluded from a tort recovery.
Sixth, Sugarman says that his general principle would reach the same
result in defense of property cases as the existing rules would reach.
However, there is little basis for confidence in that conclusion. He simply
asserts that the current details of battery doctrine, including defense of self
and property, come down to whether under the facts, the force that defendant
used was wrongful.
Consider how a jury, instructed to apply Sugarman’s general principle, would
resolve concrete questions. Would we have any assurance that they would share his
view that force likely to cause serious injury cannot be used to prevent a trespass?
Sugarman briefly concedes that “there can be some dispute as to whether certain
conduct is wrongful or not.” Indeed there can be. To put the point more bluntly,
disputes about that question will be far more numerous, and answers to that
question will be far less consistent and far more dependent on the whims of the
particular decision-maker, under an unstructured “wrongfulness” or “socially
unacceptable” criterion than under the existing legal criteria for the prima facie
cases and for the various distinct defenses. For example, in our current draft of
defense of property, a defendant must establish that the use of nondeadly force was
the only means available to protect the property, and the draft forbids the use of
force to retake real property and, under most circumstances, personal property.
Were courts to adopt Sugarman’s general wrongfulness principle, juries would be
free to reach decisions inconsistent with such rules.
As a partial response, Sugarman explains that he is willing to permit a shift
in the burden of proof as one way of capturing the distinctive privilege doctrines
such as defense of property and self-defense. But merely requiring the defendant
to disprove “wrongfulness” in particular categories of cases does not adequately
address the problems of vagueness, unpredictability and inconsistency, unless
there are clear criteria for when burden-shifting should occur. Yet once specific
criteria are articulated, the supposed advantages of a simple wrongfulness
criterion would seem to evaporate.
20 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
Brought to you by | University of California - Irvine
Authenticated | ksimons@law.uci.edu author's copy
Download Date | 6/9/18 1:29 AMElectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194108
3.3 Special rules internal to tort law
Some genuine doctrinal consequences flow from the classification of conduct as
intentional tort or negligence. In other instances, the classification appears to
have such a consequence, but in practice often does not. We agree with
Sugarman that courts too readily attribute greater significance to the classifica-
tion than is warranted, but we do not agree that the classification has no
legitimate bearing on other tort doctrines.
1. Punitive damages. We agree with Sugarman that the intentional tort/
negligence distinction does not closely track the distinction between cases that
are and are not eligible for punitive damages. Thus, we share his conclusion that
the award of such damages should be (and are in fact) based on distinct criteria,
such as recklessness or wanton conduct or the inadequacy of compensatory
damages to adequately deter the conduct in question.
2. Comparative fault principles. Sugarman also believes that the distinction
between intentional torts and negligence should be ignored for purposes of
applying comparative fault principles. We believe that a more nuanced
approach is called for.
Most jurisdictions appear to reject comparative fault and permit the negli-
gent or otherwise “faulty” plaintiff a full recovery when the defendant commits
a battery, assault, or false imprisonment, except in extremely rare and distin-
guishable circumstances, such as where the plaintiff provokes defendant to
use force or where plaintiff initially uses unjustifiable force and then defendant
overreacts and employs disproportionate force in self-defense. Moreover,
under Restatement of Torts, Second, § 71, comment b, an actor who uses
excessive force in self-defense is liable for all of the harm inflicted by the
use of such force where it is not feasible to separate the proportion of the harm
caused by the actor.
Sugarman objects to the current rule that sometimes requires ignoring P’s
initial provoking or threatening behavior when D responds with excessive force.
Here is an instance where his approach would sometimes reach a different result
than existing law, because he would have the fact-finder compare the actors’
fault in this scenario. Perhaps he is right to suggest that the fault of P and of D in
such cases should usually be compared. But we do not agree that it should
always be compared.
For example, Sugarman argues that if P attacks D, then D uses reasonable
self-defense and disarms P, but then harms the helpless P with excessive force,
comparative fault should be used. Taken to its logical extreme, this argument
would permit a surprisingly broad application of comparative fault principles.
Suppose P unjustifiably shoves D, and D gives a proportional shove in self-
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defense. A month later, D sees P and, unprovoked but still angry about the
incident, kicks P in the head. On Sugarman’s view, it seems that P’s initial
wrongful act must be compared to D’s later purely retaliatory act, potentially
resulting in a substantial reduction in P’s damages.
Now consider the far more common situation in which P is merely negli-
gent but D has committed an intentional battery. Here, current law will
typically ignore P’s fault. Sugarman finds this stance puzzling. He points out
that even when both parties are negligent, courts sometimes adopt per se rules
permitting full recovery.29 So why not apply special rules such as this when
they are called for, instead of treating every harmful battery case as triggering
a full-recovery rule?
This is a fair question. And we agree that whatever general rule is adopted
about whether to compare plaintiff’s negligence to defendant’s harmful bat-
tery, special rules will justify a different treatment in special circumstances.30
Nevertheless, we do endorse a presumption that the general rule should be as
follows: when D intends to harm P, while P is merely careless with respect to
P’s own safety, reasons of fairness, optimal deterrence, and consistency justify
awarding a full recovery to P.31 Moreover, we are not persuaded by Sugarman’s
claim that his wrongfulness criterion actually explains special rules such as
the rule that a schoolchild’s negligence in dashing across a street is not
compared to a bus driver’s negligence in dropping the child on the wrong
side of the street. Sugarman says that a judge can make a case by case
judgment about wrongful misconduct in order to rationalize a full-recovery
rule in this situation; but what really explains the sensible full-recovery rule is
the point that recognizing a very stringent duty towards children’s safety is
preferable to permitting case by case inquiry into the relative fault of children
and bus drivers.
29 Actually, courts also sometimes adopt per se rules precluding all recovery even when both P
and D have been negligent. See Kenneth W. Simons, Victim Fault and Victim Strict Responsibility
in Anglo-American Tort Law, 8 J. TORT LAW 29 (2016).
30 For a recent suggestion that comparative fault principles should be applied in some contexts
now treated as raising all-or-nothing issues of consent, see Aaron Twerski & Nina Farber,
Extending Comparative Fault to Apparent and Implied Consent Cases, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 217
(2016).
31 The presumption might also apply when P creates risks to others in addition to himself. At
the same time, the presumption arguably should not apply when D intends only to contact P, as
a result of which P suffers physical harm, which is the situation in almost all medical battery
cases. It might also not apply when P is reckless or intentionally provokes D, and is not merely
careless.
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3. Scope of liability (proximate cause). One clear doctrinal consequence of the
battery/negligence distinction is that the scope of liability (or the breadth of
proximate cause) for battery is broader than for negligence. Yet Sugarman asserts
that scope of liability does not significantly vary according to whether the under-
lying tort was an intentional tort or a tort of negligence. In support, he correctly
notes that the eggshell skull rule permits very broad liability even for negligence
torts. However, he neglects the fact that in the many situations not covered by that
rule, the scope of liability for intentional torts is wider than for negligence, and
indeed Sugarman does not question the examples in ITR that evidence this
difference.32 Also, he concedes that transferred intent doctrine might permit
liability when D intentionally shoots at X but the bullet strikes an unforeseeable
person Y, yet no similar doctrine permits liability in the analogous case when D
carelessly shoots a gun in the direction of X and the bullet strikes unforeseeable
victim Y. Sugarman admits that fairness supports different results in these two
scenarios; we agree, and we take this as evidence that the categorical difference
between battery and negligence matters for purposes of proximate cause.33
4. No duty and limited duty rules. We do agree with Sugarman that “no
duty” and “limited duty” rules sometimes draw a doctrinal line, not between
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 cmt i (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015):
[T]he scope of liability for intentional torts is not unlimited. A doctor who commits a
battery based on an honest but unreasonable and mistaken belief that the patient consents
to a particular type of medical treatment is much less culpable than an actor who
purposely or knowingly causes physical harm to another, and the scope of liability for
the former actor should be restricted accordingly. For example, suppose the doctor’s
patient becomes distressed after the mistaken extension of medical treatment causes the
loss of a limb; the patient commits suicide. Such a consequence might be considered
beyond the scope of liability. But if an actor maliciously cuts off a person’s limb, causing
the distressed victim to commit suicide, the consequence might be considered within the
scope of liability.
33 Elsewhere in the article, Sugarman takes a different view of transferred intent, dismissing it
as a gratuitous “fancy legal move” that tort law could do without. We demur: transferred intent
is an historically recognized doctrinal crystallization of the general point that courts will
recognize a broader scope of liability for intentional torts. Consider Illustration 6 from
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110 cmt b (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015):
John, a security guard at a nightclub, is angry that Rudy, an intoxicated patron, refuses to
leave. John fires a gun at Rudy in order to injure him. The bullet misses Rudy, ricochets
across the street, and strikes the bicycle of Nancy a block away. As a result, Nancy falls off
her bicycle, suffering a concussion. John is subject to liability to Nancy for battery.
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battery and negligence, but between aggravated forms of negligence and
ordinary negligence. This is often the case with respect to injuries arising
from recreational and sporting activities, for example, where courts fre-
quently preclude liability unless the defendant’s conduct was reckless, and
not merely negligent. In endorsing the significance of the battery/negligence
distinction, we certainly do not mean to suggest that this is the only legit-
imate basis for doctrinal differentiation within tort law. Similarly, as
Sugarman observes, courts have occasionally applied no-duty or limited-
duty rules to claims of battery as well as negligence claims, either explicitly
or implicitly. He aptly cites Gregory v. Cott34 in support, a case in which the
California Supreme Court determined that an Alzheimer’s patient was not
liable for injuries she intentionally caused to her professional home health
care aide who was paid to care for her.
5. Other rules. Despite our disagreement with many of Professor Sugarman’s
specific arguments, his challenge to the battery/negligence distinction is an
important one. And we do find appealing some of his suggested doctrinal
changes. For example, should the liability of children for their torts vary so
dramatically depending on whether the alleged tort is battery rather than
negligence? It is actually easier to prove that a young child committed a battery
(recall the famous case of Garrett v. Dailey,35 involving a five-year old child)
than to prove that he engaged in a negligent act, because negligence is judged
according to the standard of a reasonable child of the actor’s age and experi-
ence. This is a doctrine ripe for rethinking and might well be addressed in the
Restatement of the Law of Children, currently in progress.
3.4 Collateral rules outside tort law
With respect to collateral legal rules outside tort law, such as liability insurance
coverage, vicarious liability, and worker’s compensation, Sugarman points out
that the intentional nature of defendant’s conduct is often given weight in
determining whether the rule applies: “expected or intended” conduct is fre-
quently excluded from insurance policies, vicarious liability often does not
extend to intentional conduct by an employee (either by rule of law or, more
commonly, by a jury finding that the conduct was outside the scope of employ-
ment), and the exclusive remedy provisions of state worker’s compensation laws
often do not extend to intentional conduct by an employer. And yet, he correctly
34 331 P.3d 179 (Cal. 2014).
35 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
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observes, the battery/negligence distinction is not always precisely where the
joints of these outside rules are carved, because some nonintentional conduct is
treated in the same way as intentional conduct for these purposes, and not all
intentional conduct is treated alike.
We agree with these observations, and with Sugarman’s suggestion that
courts should employ a more refined distinction than battery/negligence in
applying these external doctrines. Some courts do employ the simple battery/
negligence distinction in these contexts.36 If they do so unthinkingly or
mechanically, they might well bring about consequences that are inconsistent
with the rationale underlying these rules. For example, it makes little sense to
treat a battery by a psychotic person as “expected or intended” under an
insurance policy and thus excluded from coverage, because (as Sugarman
agrees) denying coverage does not further insurance law’s concern about avoid-
ing moral hazard. But if a court were to mechanically apply insurance law
principles to deny coverage here, the real problem is the overly crude applica-
tion of these external legal doctrines, not the battery/negligence distinction
itself. Many courts have indeed shown their ability to sensitively apply these
external legal doctrines according to the goals they serve. Thus, there is no
reason to believe that employing the battery/negligence doctrine for other
purposes necessarily creates problematic distortions in the application of these
legal doctrines.
3.5 Sugarman’s problematic unitary standard
Sugarman’s ultimate proposal is to adopt the following unitary standard,
adapted from Restatement, Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm § 6: “An actor whose wrongful conduct is a factual cause of physical harm
is subject to liability for any such harm within the scope of liability.”37 This
standard would replace three torts now addressed in the Restatement, Third of
Torts: negligence causing physical harm; battery causing physical harm; and the
new tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm.
Sugarman then concedes: “Wrongful conduct would then have to be
defined.” That is quite an understatement! He would define it as:
36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1,
Scope Note (AM. LAW INST., 2010).
37 It is not clear whether Sugarman would include the last phrase of § 6: “unless the court
determines that the ordinary duty of reasonable care is inapplicable.”
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unreasonable conduct and unreasonable failure to act where there is a duty to act.
Unreasonableness would be failing to behave as a reasonable person in the actor’s
situation would have behaved. This would be clearly stated to include despicable, delib-
erately wrongful, wanton, reckless, grossly negligent, and ordinary negligent acts.
However, this proposal continues to raise the serious problems of vagueness,
unpredictability, and inconsistency in application noted above. For example,
Sugarman expresses confidence that his proposal will “readily” lead to liability
in such varied circumstances as a prison guard who turns down the heat for the
purpose of causing an inmate to become ill; an emergency doctor who refuses to
aid a patient out of jealousy, resulting in the patient’s avoidable death; and a
person who pulls out a chair as plaintiff is sitting down, intending the contact
but not the resulting physical harm. Yet the article never explains exactly why
these are clear cases. For example, is the omission/action distinction now
irrelevant in all physical harm cases, as the emergency doctor example might
suggest? The quoted language suggests that a duty to act would be required; yet
in the context of the tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm, there is no such
requirement.38
The proposal also raises serious questions about its scope. Sugarman would
apparently eliminate all of consent doctrine, for he endorses “folding in the
‘consent’ feature of the current draft of the Intentional Torts Restatement into my
newly proposed general principle.” He suggests that seven full sections of that
draft could be eliminated, by analogy to how negligence law has, in most
jurisdictions, eliminating the distinct defense of assumption of risk. Whatever
the merit of the abolition of assumption of risk,39 abolishing consent to an
intentional tort as a distinct doctrine could have the radical implication of
drastically increasing tort liability for physical harm caused by various types
of consensual conduct. Sugarman would no doubt resist this conclusion, for he
asserts at several points that the “wrongfulness” criterion suffices to capture
38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS, § 104, cmt b
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015). Consider Illustration 9:
D, a friend of elderly E, has agreed to take care of E’s medical and other needs and is
compensated for doing so. D knows that E has left him a small inheritance in his will. One
evening, as D is conversing with E, E has a heart attack. Deciding that this is his chance to
obtain the inheritance promptly, D fails to perform his duty to call 911, and watches E die.
D is not liable for battery, but D is subject to liability under this Section.
39 Compare Stephen D. Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L.
REV. 833 (1997); (endorsing the abolition of assumption of risk), with Kenneth W. Simons,
Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481 (2002) (endorsing a limited version of
assumption of risk).
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legitimate consent doctrines. For example, he discusses an emergency doctrine
case in which D tackles P in order to prevent P from being hit by a car, and he
concludes that this is a “clear example of conduct that is not wrongful.” But this
conclusion is much too easy. How can we be sure how different factfinders
would apply a vague “wrongfulness” test to the wide variety of cases that the
emergency doctrine currently embraces, ranging from this example to medical
treatment cases in which a doctor performs emergency surgery? How would we
include in the simple “wrongfulness” criterion the rule that the emergency
doctrine does not apply when D knows that P (such as a Jehovah’s Witness)
holds a very unusual belief rejecting emergency medical treatment (such as a
blood transfusion)?
The problematic scope of the proposal is an equally serious issue with
respect to the privileges, such as self-defense and defense of property, discussed
above. Sugarman asserts that the privileges can simply be included as com-
ments to the basic wrongfulness provision. But the privileges are not that simple
to describe. It would be unrealistic, and indeed dangerous, to delegate to
individual factfinders the raw power to determine the permissible use of force.
Under the Restatement Second and current tort law, the proportionality and
necessity standards for use of force are now spelled out with much more specific
criteria. This is, we believe, the proper approach, which we plan to implement in
future drafts of the Restatement Third. Individual juries should not be author-
ized to decide, for example, that the use of proportional force purely in retalia-
tion for a prior attack is not wrongful, or that a person facing a minor (or no)
threat of force is permitted to use deadly force in response.
Moreover, Sugarman’s approach ignores a critical difference between negli-
gence and intentional torts. For the tort of negligence, unjustifiability of the
conduct is part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. By contrast, for intentional
torts, the burden is on defendant to prove a privilege. Furthermore, the privi-
leges themselves are relatively narrow in scope. They do not embrace the wide
range of considerations that are properly weighed in judging whether a negli-
gent actor imposed an unjustifiable risk of harm on others.40
Finally, Sugarman tentatively suggests that the distinct torts of assault,
offensive battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress should be combined into a single tort of intentional dignitary harm to
the person. This suggestion encounters similar problems to those that we have
identified with respect to his physical harm proposal. These different torts
protect very different interests, ranging from fear of physical harm to humilia-
tion or offense from a physical touching to freedom of movement. Much would
40 See Simons, supra note 4, at 1099–1100.
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be lost, and little gained, by submerging these differences within a single
vaguely defined intentional tort.
3.6 Conclusion
In the end, the desirability of Sugarman’s proposal turns on the importance of
history and precedent in tort law; on the relative merits of standards and rules, a
perennial issue for legal actors who articulate legal doctrine; and on whether
more specific criteria of intentional tort liability are both feasible and valuable.
With respect to the first point, reasonable minds differ about the extent to which
tort doctrine should be continuous with the past or instead should be modified,
even radically, in order to better serve consequentialist goals or to better reflect
corrective justice, fairness, or rights-based principles. However, insofar as the
Restatements of Torts are addressed to judges and not legislators, considerable
deference is owed to history and precedent. Moreover, caution and modesty are
warranted with respect to the appropriate limits of the judicial role in furthering
policy goals and expressing socially desirable principles.
With respect to the second point, Sugarman’s proposal for a standard rather
than a set of rules to govern tortious causation of physical harm indeed has
some merit.41 First, there is the obvious value of simplicity when the law
employs a single overarching standard, thus avoiding line-drawing difficulties
in identifying the boundaries of different torts. Second, the generality of his
standard-based proposal does, in some cases, better further the underlying
purposes of tort law than current law’s rule-based approach, as we have seen.
At the same time, however, a rule-based approach can evolve over time. A good
example of such doctrinal progress is ITR’s new tort of purposeful infliction of
bodily harm. This tort fills a lacuna created by battery doctrine’s requirement of
a physical contact.
The third point is, we believe, a fatal objection to Sugarman’s approach.
Specific criteria of intentional tort liability are quite feasible to articulate, as the
three Restatement projects to date demonstrate. And as we have tried to show
throughout this response, these more detailed criteria have a much greater
41 Near the end of his article, Sugarman briefly asserts that rules are not precluded by his
proposal. As an example, he states that it might be unreasonable as a matter of law to use
deadly force in the defense of property. This concession, if taken seriously, would create
exceptions that would swallow his proposal. In this reply, we assume that he is serious about
his proposal and does not endorse elaborate exceptions that would simply replicate existing tort
doctrine.
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capacity to accurately and fully express the relevant features of intentional tort
liability than is possible through the use of a reductive “wrongfulness” test.
4 Reply to Moore
In her paper for this symposium, “Restating Intentional Torts: Problems of Process
and Substance in the ALI’s Third Restatement of Torts,” Professor Moore carefully
elucidates a number of concerns about ITR, which we shall address in the
following order: (A) the piecemeal process of the Restatement, Third of Torts is
highly problematic; (B) ITR imposes excessively broad liability for omissions to
release a person from a confinement and omissions to prevent a primary actor
from committing an intentional tort; (C) in other respects as well, ITR is too willing
to push the boundaries of existing doctrine; (D) ITR has blurred rather than
clarified the boundaries between the intentional torts and other torts, primarily
negligence; and (E) ITR should take account of collateral legal doctrines.
We wish to acknowledge at the outset the meticulous, thorough, and
insightful analysis that Moore offers. In this reply, we are unable to respond to
each of her thoughtful arguments, but we will consider them all as we continue
work on ITR.
4.1 The piecemeal development of the Restatement Third
of Torts
One concern emphasized by Moore is the piecemeal nature of the process of
assembling the Restatement, Third of Torts in general and the Intentional Torts
Restatement in particular. With respect to the first point, we agree that
the sequential development of the various Restatement Third projects over a
lengthy period of time has been unfortunate in some respects. For example, the
Reporters for the Restatement of Products Liability were required to address
issues of causation that were later addressed more thoroughly, but in a some-
what different manner, by the Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
project.42 In addition, broadly-applicable principles such as participation
42 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §  (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(using “substantial factor” language) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 26, cmt j (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (disapproving “substantial
factor” language).
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liability have been drafted in piecemeal fashion by Reporters for different
projects, and will likely not be restated at all as applied to negligence. In
retrospect, the coordination between different Restatement Third projects
would have been improved by beginning most or all of the projects at the
same time, with the Reporters for the different projects harmonizing their efforts
and ensuring that common issues were treated consistently. At the same time,
we do not believe that serious issues of inconsistency have arisen in the
Restatement Third project.
With respect to the second point, similarly, we believe that Moore overstates
the problem. She is correct, of course, that the various parts of our Restatement
project are interconnected, and yet the approval process requires sequencing the
parts. The project began with individual torts and transferred intent, is now
turning to consent and participation, and will soon turn to the defenses, such as
self-defense and defense of property. However, every Restatement project faces
this problem. Given the number of projects that the ALI is now undertaking, and
the limited time available at Council and Annual Meetings for each project, it is
a practical necessity to sequence the different sections of a project over a period
of years, rather than present all or most of the sections at once to the Council or
Annual Meeting for a very extended discussion.
Moreover, as Reporters, we have been sensitive to Moore’s concern—thus,
we have not yet requested approval of the black letter sections and comments
relating to consent for the individual torts of battery, assault, and purposeful
infliction of bodily harm, even though the other sections of those torts have
already been approved (with the exception of offensive battery). And we are
confident that there will be adequate opportunity to return to earlier sections
and make necessary changes in light of unanticipated issues that arise in later
sections. Even if the Council and membership have approved a section that,
upon later reflection, requires modification, the entire project will eventually be
submitted for final approval as a Proposed Final Draft, and the modification can
readily be made at that point. As Reporters, we are quite committed to producing
the best possible product, even if this requires changes to sections that we
initially believed were in final shape. (One example is our agreement with a
criticism that Moore offers in her article, concerning the scope of liability for the
omission to release a person from confinement, discussed below.) Thus, we do
not share Moore’s concern that the ALI “is now locked into various decisions
that it might not have made” if it had seen the newer material now under
consideration.
We do agree, however, with some of Moore’s criticisms arising from the
sequential process for restating tort law. Moore notes that the Restatement, Third
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm endorsed an “umbrella”
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intentional tort in the black letter of Section 5: “An actor who intentionally
causes physical harm is subject to liability for that harm,” and she observes that
this provision is inconsistent with the approach to intentional torts in ITR in
several respects: it does not accurately map onto intentional tort doctrines, for it
is both underinclusive43 and overinclusive44 of those doctrines. Moreover, it
relies on a somewhat crude hierarchy of fault. Although the comment to
Section 5 significantly qualifies the black letter language,45 she contends that
this qualification is in serious tension with the black letter. Furthermore, Section
5 and the comments appear to endorse the dual intent test for battery46 (requir-
ing an intent to harm or offend, as well as an intent to contact), which ITR has
rejected in favor of a single intent test. As a result, Section 5 remains misleading
and risks causing significant confusion.
We largely agree with these criticisms. The explanation for Section 5 is that
the ALI was not then contemplating a comprehensive restatement of most of tort
law in the Restatement Third of Torts but rather expected the project to serve as
a statement of “general principles.” It was thus thought desirable to treat the
issue of intentional torts in this abbreviated way. But in retrospect, it is unfor-
tunate that Section 5 was approved, because its simple distillation of intentional
tort doctrine is regrettably simplistic. The ALI should, we believe, consider
including language in the electronic database versions of Section 5 that cross-
reference ITR and warn readers that Section 5 itself should not be employed as a
43 Battery liability is not limited to contacts that are intended to cause physical harm; under
single intent, it embraces intentional contacts that cause harm but were not intended to have
that effect. And, of course, offensive batteries, assault, and false imprisonment are recognized
intentional torts to persons that are not embraced by Section 5.
44 In the rare case where an actor intentionally causes harm but not by way of physical
contact, battery doctrine does not permit recovery, yet Section 5 suggests that recovery is
warranted. In ITR, the tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm does permit liability in
some cases in which Section 5 would extend liability beyond battery, but not in all such
cases. As Moore observes, the purposeful bodily harm tort does not impose liability when an
actor merely knows that his conduct will cause physical harm, while the language of Section 5
seems§ broad enough to recognize liability in such cases.
45 Comment a explains that the Section “does not replace the doctrines for specific intentional
torts, such as battery, assault, false imprisonment, and others,” but rather “provides a frame-
work that encompasses many specific torts for intentionally caused physical harm.”
46 Moore might be correct about this, for all of the examples in the comments to Section 5 are
indeed of intent to cause harm. On the other hand, Section 5 and its comments do not mention
the controversy about whether battery requires single intent or dual intent; moreover, they
provide that intent to cause physical harm is sufficient for tort liability; they do not provide that
it is necessary. By contrast, the dual intent version of battery does provide that intent to harm
(or offend) is necessary for liability.
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stand-alone tort nor invoked in a jury instruction. Instead, readers should
consult the much more specific criteria provided by ITR for the separate inten-
tional torts restated in ITR.47
Moore also is concerned about other provisions of ITR that she believes are
in tension with other portions of the Restatement Third of Torts. Consider two of
her examples. First, she notes that ITR declines to take a position on whether
negligent conduct that results in a confinement but does not cause bodily harm
should result in tort liability. In practical effect, ITR’s agnosticism on this point
is equivalent to the Restatement Second’s Caveat addressing the same issue.48
As Moore observes, some states have endorsed tort liability in these circum-
stances—for example, when an actor’s negligence results in the plaintiff being
confined in jail on erroneous charges. She surmises that ITR does not take a firm
position on the question because “it would have been exceedingly difficult to
propose a section creating liability for merely negligent conduct in a
Restatement project limited to restating the intentional torts.” It would have
been much better, she suggests, if the Reporters for the project on Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm had addressed this topic. We agree with her
analysis and conclusion here. Indeed her critique applies beyond this particular
doctrine: the Restatement Third’s treatment of negligence leaves a number of
holes that will not be filled until a fourth Restatement of the topic. Some of these
holes might not exist had the entire subject been restated simultaneously.
However, we suspect that others would still remain, because comprehensive
treatment of such a broad area of the law is bound to overlook some issues.
Second, Moore raises the question of how ITR addresses cases in which a
physician provides treatment because of a negligently mistaken belief that a
patient consents. She points to an ITR Illustration in which a surgeon fails to
read the medical notes in which the patient insists on a different surgeon
performing a procedure. The illustration states that if it was unreasonable of
the surgeon not to read the notes, then the surgeon cannot rely on apparent
consent to preclude liability. Moore asks an important question about the
illustration: how is reasonableness to be determined? Will it be judged by a
reasonable person test, or instead by the test of medical custom that typically
applies in medical malpractice cases? We believe that courts are likely to apply a
47 Our research of cases that cite Section 5 suggests that no court has been misled by the
current language of Section 5 to misapply the traditional requirements of battery doctrine.
48 Moore seems critical of ITR’s decision to state in a comment that this issue remains open,
rather than to formally issue a Caveat to this effect. However, it is no longer customary for the
Restatement Third of Torts to employ Caveats. There is no significant difference between a
Caveat and a statement in a comment that the ALI takes no position on a question.
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reasonable person test, because the situation is comparable to the question of
the proper standard for a medical practitioner’s duty to disclose the material
risks of a medical treatment. In the latter situation, the duty to obtain the
patient’s informed consent is usually governed by a reasonable person test,
not by medical custom, because the duty to disclose depends on the informa-
tional needs of the patient, not the medical expertise of the doctor. Similarly,
whether medical practitioners have used reasonable care to investigate and
communicate accurately the scope and nature of the treatment to which a
patient has (or has not) consented would seem to depend on the need to respect
the patient’s right to consent, not on medical expertise.49 But Moore is correct
that the issue underscores a deeper problem: the Restatement Third of Torts has
not heretofore addressed the topic of professional malpractice. This lacuna
makes it more difficult to reach a firm conclusion about how ITR should resolve
these issues.50
A further example offered by Moore is ITR’s endorsement of single intent as
the intent requirement for battery. Moore believes that members of the ALI who
supported this position in preference to the alternative dual intent view did not
realize that single intent would create the following problems that dual intent
does not: (1) adopting single intent necessitates a vague and controversial
implied-in-law category of consent, and (2) it makes the question of comparative
fault much more difficult, because plaintiff’s fault is plausibly viewed as irrele-
vant if the actor had the (dual) intent to harm or offend but not if the actor
merely had the (single) intent to contact. With respect to (1), ALI members were
well aware that the Reporters contemplated coupling the single intent require-
ment with a category of implied-in-law consent: § 2, comment b discusses the
latter category, and Illustration 7 is an exemplar. With respect to (2), Moore is
correct that courts and legislatures are more likely to apply comparative fault
principles to cases in which the defendant acts merely with single intent, such as
a doctor making a negligent mistake about the scope of a patient’s consent or a
practical joker forming a good faith but foolish belief that the victim would
consent. However, if a court concludes that comparative fault principles should
apply in such cases but not in dual intent cases where the actor has the intent to
49 To the extent that ITR leaves this matter unaddressed, we will certainly amend the relevant
comment with an appropriate discussion.
50 A similar issue arises with ITR’s consent § 18, which explains the distinction between
medical treatment inadequate consent cases that are properly treated as batteries and those
that are properly treated as negligent failure to obtain informed consent. This Section would be
more useful and authoritative if earlier Restatement Third of Torts projects had specifically
addressed the standards governing the negligent failure to obtain informed consent.
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harm or offend, it may readily craft a comparative fault rule to that effect.51
Moreover, a recent paper presents an intriguing argument that comparative fault
principles should apply in any intentional tort case in which both plaintiff and
defendant contributed to a misunderstanding about the scope of consent.52
4.2 Does ITR impose excessively broad liability for omissions?
One issue that Moore discusses in some detail is intentional tort liability for
omissions. She expresses concern about the different manner in which the
Restatement Third addresses liability for omissions for different intentional
torts. As she notes, the Restatement declines to recognize omission liability for
battery or assault, but does endorse such liability for false imprisonment, for the
new tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm, and for participation in or
instigation of another’s intentional tort. Moore objects that the Restatement
does not offer principled reasons for these distinctions.
In reply, we note that the Restatement does offer reasons for the distinc-
tions, resting on history, principle, and concerns about unduly wide liability.
One example is § 1, comment c:
Under … a rule [permitting battery liability for an omission], a teacher who omits to take
steps to prevent one student from attacking and injuring another student could be subject
to battery liability so long as a jury finds that the teacher knew (with substantial certainty)
that the attack would occur and that the teacher could have prevented the attack. An
employer who fails to prevent an employee from being harmed (or merely offensively
contacted) by a dangerous environmental pollutant not of the employer’s creation might
also be liable for battery.
Moore also specifically criticizes the treatment of omissions in the false impri-
sonment and participation provisions. With respect to false imprisonment, she
objects to the scope of the duty to rescue a person from confinement and is
skeptical about the comment’s suggestions about the source of such a duty.
Thus, she objects that the duty should be limited to instances in which the
defendant “refuses” to help a person escape from confinement, as the
Restatement Second § 45 provides, and should not extend to all instances in
which the defendant breaches a duty to help the person escape, as the
Restatement Third § 7 provides. It is difficult properly to assess Moore’s concern,
51 Notably, even when the basis of a plaintiff’s lawsuit is defendant’s negligence, courts
recognize several categories of “no liability” or “full liability” rules that displace the back-
ground rule of comparative negligence. See Simons, supra note 29.).
52 See Twerski & Farber, supra note 30.
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because it is not clear what amounts to “refusing” to help as opposed to
breaching a duty not to help.53 After all, a separate requirement of false impri-
sonment is that the actor knows that the person is or will be confined, or intends
such a confinement. One might therefore say that any failure of an actor to use
reasonable care to extricate a person from confinement even though the actor
has such knowledge or such an intention simply constitutes a “refusal” to save
the person.
However, perhaps “refusing” has a narrower connotation, of making no
effort at all, as opposed to trying but incompetently failing to successfully aid
another.54 If a security guard is unable to find the right key to unlock a person
from confinement because he has carelessly lost the key, perhaps he has not
“refused” to release the person and should not be liable for false imprisonment.
But if he decides to delay releasing a person from the locked store while he gets
a cup of coffee, his choice not to make any effort to facilitate the release until he
has completed his personal errand arguably should be treated as a “refusal” to
release the person.
There is no question that a refusal to release another, in this sense, should
qualify as a false imprisonment, while it is a much closer question whether unrea-
sonable, inadequate efforts to release a person from confinement when one has a
duty to do so should so qualify. To be sure, a number of cases recognize false
imprisonment liability of actors who have custody over a person and who know-
ingly or merely negligently fail to release the person as required by law.55 But
almost all of these cases involve the scope of a privilege to detain (as a defense to an
intentional false imprisonment). Perhaps liability for an inadequate effort to satisfy
the requirements of such a privilege is (as Moore argues) less troublesome than
liability for an inadequate effort to comply with a duty to extricate a person from a
confinement in a case that does not involve such a privilege.
53 Although the Restatement Second § 45 employs the language of “refusal,” and most of its
illustrations include that language, one of its illustrations does not. Moreover, comment b,
quoted in a footnote below, presupposes that one can be liable for making an unsuccessful and
unreasonable effort to help another escape from confinement. Thus, in the last sentence,
comment b states: “The actor is not required to do more than is reasonable under the
circumstances,” implying that if he does less, he is liable. Thus, it is not entirely clear that
the term “refusal” in the black letter of § 45 is actually intended to establish a standard that is
any narrower than “unreasonable breach of duty to release.”
54 Moore does not hazard a definition. She does approve of liability “for a deliberate, purpose-
ful refusal” to release someone from confinement. But it is not clear what this language adds to
the separate requirement under both the Restatement Second and the Restatement Third that
the defendant must knowingly or purposely confine the plaintiff.
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 7, cmt f,
Reporters’ Note (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2017).
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Moore also raises the legitimate question why a sharp distinction should
be drawn between failure to use reasonable care to prevent a confinement
from occurring in the first instance, which all agree is not an intentional false
imprisonment, and failure to use reasonable care to release someone from a
confinement that one realizes has already occurred. One answer is that
liability for the first type of failure might dramatically expand the scope of
false imprisonment (e. g. imposing liability on airlines that do not take
sufficient care to prevent flight delays or on security guards who do not
adequately inspect the entire property they are charged with securing),
while the second type is much less likely to do so. Another answer56 is that
false imprisonment creates liability even in the absence of physical harm,
and it would be unduly onerous to impose a general duty to use reasonable
care not to unjustifiably confine another (as opposed to the much narrower
duty not to intentionally and unjustifiably confine another). Still, there is
reason to hesitate before recognizing liability whenever a defendant with a
duty to release a plaintiff from confinement attempts to facilitate a release yet
is incompetent or negligent in those rescue efforts. Moreover, there is very
little case law bearing on this question.
Accordingly, Professor Moore has persuaded us to modify our prior position
on this point: we will use the language “refusal to release” (or similar language)
recognized in the Restatement Second. We will also clarify that this standard is
only met if the actor breaches a duty to facilitate the release of the plaintiff by
making no effort to do so. But we will also underscore that a more demanding
standard governs the issue of the scope of a privilege to confine a person. Thus,
if prison officials unreasonably fail to execute a judge’s order to release a person
in custody immediately, they are subject to liability for false imprisonment, even
if their omission cannot be characterized as a “refusal” to release the person.
As to the second issue, the source of the duty to aid a confined person, the
Restatement Third attempts to give greater guidance than the Restatement
Second provides.57 That is why the Restatement Third states that the affirmative
duties specified in Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm § 38–44 presumptively apply. It is surprising that Moore finds ITR’s
56 Suggested by Professor Benjamin Zipursky. Email from Benjamin Zipursky to Kenneth
W. Simons, (27 June 2016) (on file with author).
57 The Restatement Second, § 45, comment b, merely says:It is not within the scope of this
Restatement to state when the duty to aid another in release from confinement may arise.
Factors to be taken into account are the degree of inconvenience, effort, and expense necessary
to make such aid effective, and the extent to which the actor has already made a reasonable but
unsuccessful effort, as well as the availability of other sources of help. The actor is not required
to do more than is reasonable under the circumstances.
36 K. W. Simons and W. J. Cardi
Brought to you by | University of California - Irvine
Authenticated | ksimons@law.uci.edu author's copy
Download Date | 6/9/18 1:29 AMElectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194108
treatment of duty problematic, a treatment that most likely recognizes a sig-
nificantly narrower scope of duty than the vague, multi-factor, potentially
expansive test that the Restatement Second suggests.58
Moore also criticizes our position with respect to omission liability for
participation. She characterizes our approach as an expansion of the
Restatement Second’s provisions and questions our interpretation of the cases
cited in our supporting Reporters’ Note, suggesting that the cases do not repre-
sent instances of omission liability. We do not believe that we are innovating in
recognizing that participation liability often rests on what are essentially argu-
ments of omission, and we stand by our interpretation of both the Restatement
Second and the cases we cite. Implicit in Moore’s critique is the assumption that
if a defendant took any action whatsoever with respect to a third-party wrong-
doer’s act, the defendant’s liability necessarily involves misfeasance rather than
nonfeasance. This is, in our view, an inaccurate description of the law.
Thus, suppose a police officer A participates in an arrest and does
nothing to stop his partner B’s subsequent beating of the arrestee but does
not actively instigate, encourage, or contribute any force to that beating. A is
liable for battery only by omission or nonfeasance.59 This is likely true even
pursuant to the extraordinarily broad definition of misfeasance prescribed by
Section 7 of the Restatement Third of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm. Comment o to that section explains that a case involves
misfeasance if the “actor’s conduct or course of conduct results in a greater
risk to another.” Accordingly, if the officer B would have made the initial
arrest even without A’s assistance, then the participation claim against A for
the beating is based on pure nonfeasance. Furthermore, even if A’s conduct
was a factor causally contributing to the arrest, the plaintiff’s battery claim
remains one of omission. It cannot be said that the duty to interrupt a
partner’s subsequent beating of a recent arrestee is part of the duty of
reasonable care owed in conducting the arrest itself.60 Rather, if the
58 See prior footnote.
59 See Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605 (D. Mass. 1982) (cited in our Reporters’ Notes and
by Professor Moore).
60 A defendant’s prior creation of a risk creates a subsequent, affirmative duty to warn,
protect, or rescue a plaintiff from that risk. See Maldonado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 629
P.2d 1001 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). However, risk-creation does not give rise to a duty to protect
from all subsequently-developing risks, but only those risks foreseeably resulting from the
original conduct. For example, suppose that pedestrian A non-negligently runs into B during
rush-hour on a sidewalk, knocking B down into the road. A would certainly owe an affirmative
duty to use reasonable care to rescue B from oncoming traffic. But suppose that B falling into
the road catches the attention of B’s ex-husband who happens to be walking nearby, and he
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defendant owes an affirmative duty in this scenario, it is likely due to the
custodial relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the defendant’s
relationship with the batterer, or the defendant’s official duties as a police
officer. Similar reasoning explains each of the cases cited by Moore and ITR.
As this brief discussion highlights, at the heart of this issue are two
related matters: (1) the relationship of participation liability to factual
causation and (2) whether risk-creating conduct is required for participation
liability. As we explain in the comments to Section 10, our interpretation of
the Restatement Second and the case law is that neither causation nor risk-
creating conduct is required so long as the elements of Section 10 are
satisfied. Indeed, this is a major reason for recognizing so-called “concerted
action” liability. Consider, as one final example, the first Illustration in
Section 10, borrowed from the Second Restatement: “A, B, C, and D decide
to commit a robbery at E’s house. A breaks down E’s front door, B ties E up,
C beats E, and D steals and carries away E’s jewelry. A, B, C, and D are all
subject to liability for trespass to land, false imprisonment, battery, and
conversion.” In this hypothetical, without the participation of D (for
instance), A, B, and C might still have committed the robbery, and C
might nonetheless have beaten E. In such a case, D neither was a factual
cause of E’s beating nor acted in any way that increased the risk of that
beating. Nonetheless, D is liable as a participant in E’s lawsuit for physical
harm. Although D acted or “misfeased” in stealing E’s jewelry, the fact
remains that E’s participation claim for battery against D is based on D’s
omission.
4.3 Does ITR inappropriately extend existing doctrine?
Another concern and surprise, according to Moore, is how willing the Reporters
have been to push the boundaries of existing doctrine. She offers two examples—
recognition of a tort of purposeful infliction of bodily harm (which was approved
at the 2015 annual meeting) and our proposal to define offensive battery as
extending to cases in which the actor knows that the plaintiff will be highly
begins to beat B. A arguably owes no affirmative duty to stop the beating because it was not one
of the risks foreseeably created by knocking B into the street. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 36 & cmt c (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (duty
to minimize risks that actor’s conduct created applies only to “a continuing risk of physical
harm of a type characteristic of the conduct”).
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offended by the intentional touching.61 The Restatement also includes some other
changes in doctrinal formulations, most of them quite modest.62 Whether the
Intentional Torts Restatement has inappropriately extended existing doctrine is
a matter upon which reasonable people may disagree. But it is important, we
think, to place this question in perspective.
A first perspective is historical. When Francis Bohlen began work on the
First Restatement of Torts in 1923, he was writing, to a considerable extent, on a
tabula rasa. His own formulations of the intentional torts were very often not
taken from existing case law or jury instructions. They were largely inventions—
brilliant distillations and reformulations of the cases and academic commentary,
but inventions nevertheless. By contrast, when William Prosser took on the role
of producing the Second Restatement, he made very few changes to the sub-
stance of the First Restatement intentional tort provisions.63 His conservative
approach can partly be explained by the fact that the first Restatement’s doc-
trinal formulations were widely accepted by courts, at least insofar as they were
widely quoted.
However, “widely quoted” does not mean “widely applied.” And this brings
us to a second perspective, specific to the context of intentional torts: the
problem of scarce authority. There is not an abundance of case law addressing
the doctrinal criteria of the torts addressed in this Restatement. A number of
reasons might explain this dearth of authority: the potential damage award is
often too small to justify the costs of litigation; insurance policies often do not
cover intentional torts; other collateral legal rules such as limits on vicarious
liability discourage the assertion of intentional tort claims; and many defen-
dants might have an especially strong incentive to settle intentional tort claims
in order to avoid reputational harm.
The historical perspective suggests that somewhat less deference might be
owed to the intentional tort formulations presented in the prior two restate-
ments, since these formulations reflect the novel criteria created for the first
61 At the 2017 meeting, the membership rejected the offensive battery proposal in its original
form but endorsed an extension of offensive battery to contacts by which the actor had the
purpose to highly offend the plaintiff.
62 For example, ITR employs the language of anticipation rather than apprehension in the
definition of assault; endorses a single intent rather than dual intent test for battery, a matter
about which courts are divided; and proposes change to false imprisonment’s definitions of
confinement and of submission to legal authority.
63 However, Prosser did make significant organizational changes, and a very few substantive
changes, including broadening false imprisonment liability in two ways: consciousness of the
confinement is not required if the plaintiff is “harmed” by the confinement; and forms of duress
other than threats of physical force can suffice for a confinement.
Restating the Intentional Torts to Persons 39
Brought to you by | University of California - Irvine
Authenticated | ksimons@law.uci.edu author's copy
Download Date | 6/9/18 1:29 AMElectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194108
Restatement, which were then adopted with very little change in the second.
Moreover, the scarce authority problem suggests that, in drafting the Third
Restatement, it is both necessary and desirable to consider, not merely what a
handful of reported cases have said on a topic, but how well the treatment of the
topic coheres with other doctrines within intentional tort law. And that broader
lens sometimes supports a broadening of the doctrinal formulations. These
considerations help explain the choice of ITR to recognize liability for purpose-
ful infliction of bodily harm in § 4 and to recommend recognition of offensive
battery liability when the actor contacts a plaintiff knowing, or acting with the
purpose, that this will cause a plaintiff to be highly offended. On the other hand,
ITR also identifies many instances (for example, omission liability for battery or
assault) in which we recognize that plausible arguments exist for extending
existing doctrine, but we conclude that the absence of case law support militates
against such an extension.
4.4 Does ITR blur the boundaries between intentional torts
and other torts?
Moore offers a thoughtful, birds-eye overview of the place of intentional torts to
persons within tort law generally, relying in part on prior analyses of this topic
by Professor Ellen Bublick64 and by one of the present authors.65 She largely
accepts the view that ITR should not always express a simple hierarchy of fault,
under which intentional torts invariably express a more serious degree of culp-
ability than negligence. Thus, she agrees with Simons that intentional torts and
negligence, and indeed different intentional torts, are sometimes “apples and
oranges.”66 Nevertheless, Moore believes that ITR unduly blurs the lines
between intentional torts and negligence-based torts.
One of her general concerns is what she perceives as inconsistent explana-
tions of doctrine. For example, she notes that ITR supports both the general
requirement for false imprisonment liability that the plaintiff was contempora-
neously aware of the confinement, and also an exception where an unaware
plaintiff suffers bodily harm as a result of the confinement. And Section 7, cmt h
supports this result based on the hierarchy of fault principle: although negli-
gence liability would frequently permit liability in such cases, intentional tort
64 Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons—
Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335 (2009).
65 Simons, supra note 4.
66 See id. at 1080–1083.
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liability might be viewed as more appropriate insofar as the intentional actor is
typically more culpable than a merely negligent actor. But Moore finds this
reliance on the fault hierarchy problematic, since ITR sometimes rejects that
principle—for example, in recognizing battery liability for single rather than
dual intent.
We concur with Moore’s observation that the same argument (such as the
fault hierarchy) is given more weight in explaining or justifying some doctrines
within ITR than in explaining others. But we do not believe that this approach to
explanation and justification should be viewed as troubling. As explained ear-
lier, the task of a contemporary judge formulating tort doctrine is not to derive
that doctrine from general principles of justice, fairness, liberty, social welfare,
or efficiency. Rather, the judge’s (and hence the Reporter’s) role is to articulate
realistic and justifiable criteria for judges and juries to apply to the ongoing
project of identifying when an actor violated the legal right of another, and
when the other is entitled to a legal remedy from the actor. In explaining and
justifying these criteria, judges should of course avoid irrational or incoherent
rationales, but they need not undertake the Herculean effort of deducing doc-
trine from abstract principles. Indeed, if the principles underlying tort law are
pluralistic, as many believe,67 then even the adoption of a deductive, ahistorical
approach is no simple solution to the challenges of coherence and consistency.
A more specific concern noted by Moore is that ITR employs reasonableness
criteria with some frequency. She invokes this fact as undermining the claim
that intentional torts are distinctive insofar as they employ more rule-like criteria
than the standard-like reasonableness tests of negligence law. Here, she echoes
a criticism that Professor Sugarman makes even more forcefully in this volume—
that the inclusion of reasonableness standards in ITR amounts to the stealth
introduction of negligence principles.
But if one examines more carefully the situations in which the Restatement
employs reasonableness criteria, it becomes clear that ITR has not surrepti-
tiously diluted or transmuted intentional tort law into negligence law. Rather,
reasonableness criteria are employed in the interstices of the edifice of inten-
tional torts. And they are typically so employed in order to avoid recognizing a
form of liability that is either too wide or too narrow. For example, consider
apparent consent, which does employ a test of whether the actor reasonably
believes that the plaintiff actually consents. This test focuses not on the reason-
ableness of the defendant’s conduct, full stop, but on the reasonableness of his
beliefs about the other person’s consent. Similarly, reasonable mistakes about
67 See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 3; Hershovitz, supra note 9, at 962 (“there are lots of
torts because there are lots of ways of wronging people”); Simons, id.
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the facts that would justify an actor in defending his person or property preclude
liability—but again, not because the jury is entitled to make an all-things-
considered judgment that the actor’s conduct was reasonable. Rather, the
jury’s role is much more limited; the question is only whether the actor made
a reasonable factual mistake about the specific proportionality and necessity
criteria that the law establishes for the privileges of self-defense and defense of
property.68
Another concern identified by Moore is how the boundary line between
battery and negligence is drawn in the field of medical treatment. She reiterates
her support for a requirement that a doctor “intentionally deviate” from the
consent given by the patient, which she understands as meaning that the doctor
must intentionally contact the patient in a manner that the doctor knows is
beyond the scope of the patient’s consent; a negligent mistake about the patient’s
consent would be insufficient. In the recent C.D. 4, we respond to this argument
for an unusually deferential standard by suggesting that the case law support for
her interpretation is uncertain and by endorsing the application of the usual test
of apparent consent in this context, which asks whether the doctor reasonably
believed that his intentional contact was of a type to which the patient actually
consented.69 However, we also suggest that if courts are concerned that applying
the usual test would unduly burden medical practitioners, they might establish
appropriate per se or presumptive rules that under specified circumstances, a
doctor’s mistake about the scope of consent is reasonable.70
Moore also expresses concern about cases in which the doctor inadvertently
and unreasonably treats a part of the patient’s body that is not within the scope
of actual consent, such as operating on the wrong limb: she would treat such a
case under the rubric of negligence, applying medical malpractice criteria, not
the rubric of battery. In reply, we would first distinguish two kinds of inadver-
tent treatment. If a surgeon’s hand slips, causing her to make an incision in the
wrong location, battery liability is unavailable, because the surgeon did not
68 Moore is concerned about the vague standards that govern implied-in-law consent. This is a
legitimate concern, and going forward, we will make every effort to make those standards as
precise as possible, lest this category of consent balloon so large that it swallows all of the
specific tort privileges. We do not, however, share her view that this category is “entirely new”;
although it was not explicitly formulated in the prior Restatements, courts and scholars have
long recognized or presupposed such a category.
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 16, cmt e (AM.
LAW INST., Council Draft No. 4, 2017). This draft was not available to Professor Moore when she
wrote her article.
70 Id. “For example, a court might determine that a surgeon is ordinarily entitled to assume
that the hospital’s standard consent forms have been properly signed prior to surgery.”
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intentionally contact the patient at that location.71 The patient’s only recourse is
negligence. But if a surgeon intentionally operates on the left leg rather than the
right leg, not realizing that this is contrary to the patient’s consent, we believe
that the patient is entitled to sue either for harmful battery (because the contact
will undoubtedly cause physical harm) or for negligence. Since this fact pattern
potentially satisfies the criteria of both torts, the patient should have the choice
of remedy. Moore resists this conclusion, believing that the only remedy should
be in negligence. In most cases, her approach will be satisfactory to plaintiffs.
(Note that one possible detriment of a negligence lawsuit, the usual need to offer
expert evidence about the standard of care, might not exist in this fact pattern,
insofar as some jurisdictions will treat a “wrong limb” case as satisfying res ipsa
loquitur.) However, if a battery cause of action provides certain procedural,
proof, remedial, or other practical advantages in some of these cases, we see
no compelling reason to limit the plaintiff to a negligence theory.
4.5 Collateral legal rules for intentional harms or torts
A final issue that Moore helpfully raises is the important question of whether ITR
should, in formulating doctrine, take account of collateral legal rules, such as
the contractual exclusion of insurance coverage for harms that are “expected or
intended.” Courts sometimes treat the characterization of an actor’s conduct as
an intentional tort as automatically triggering such a collateral rule. ITR’s view is
that courts and legislatures should carefully consider whether a collateral rule
should be triggered and should be sensitive to the concern that an automatic
trigger of this sort will not always serve the public policy underlying the rule. As
just one example, “courts have noted that, even if a person with a mental
disability is liable for an intentional tort, it does not follow that the person
intentionally caused injury within the meaning of the insurance exclusion.”72
Moore originally shared ITR’s view on the matter. However, after observing that
a more sensitive application of collateral rules is unlikely to occur, she now
takes the position that ITR should take account of these collateral effects in
determining the criteria and scope of the doctrines within ITR.
There is considerable force to Moore’s position. Restatement Reporters
should not be blind to the practical effects of their work. And it is understand-
able and predictable that courts and legislators often take the simple approach
71 See id. at § 18, cmt b.
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS Scope Note (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
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of treating the intentional tort category as automatically triggering a collateral
rule. On the other hand, if we were to give significant weight to all the pre-
dictable legal effects of ITR, the doctrines that we propose would be unstable.
Restatements are meant to last for a considerable period of time, and any
predictions about the effect on collateral legal rules would be uncertain.
Moreover, it is of course beyond the jurisdiction of ALI Restatement projects to
attempt to settle the content of collateral legal rules such as the effect of our
definitions of intentional torts on worker’s compensation recovery, insurance
coverage, or vicarious liability. Finally, in some collateral contexts, especially
worker’s compensation cases, courts have in fact developed specific rules that
define “intentional torts” in a manner that is appropriately sensitive to that
context.73 Thus, we believe that the better course in ITR is to highlight any
problematic effects of collateral legal rules of which we are aware, thus encoura-
ging those legal actors responsible for the rules to modify or refine them.
5 Reply to Chamallas
In her article, “The Elephant in the Room: Sidestepping the Affirmative Consent
Debate in the Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts,” Professor Martha
Chamallas critiques ITR’s treatment of consent as it applies to sexual battery
cases. Chamallas presents a thoughtful, measured, historically informed, and
powerful argument in favor of the adoption in the Restatement of an affirmative
consent standard. In this response, we hope to show that the positions we have
taken in this Restatement, and that we plan to take in future drafts, on the crucial
question of the proper criteria for consent to sexual conduct are not as far from
her views as she may suppose. At the same time, however, we do not share her
view that the Restatement should unequivocally endorse the affirmative consent
approach that she espouses. In arriving at this position, we are cognizant of the
fact that it is a Restatement, not a Model Code of Tort Law, that we are drafting.
That fact is what prompts our hesitation about fully endorsing her approach.
5.1 “No means no” and “Only yes means yes”
Before we turn to the substance of Chamallas’s argument, it is worth under-
scoring the ways in which the current Restatement draft departs from traditional
73 See id., Reporters’ Note.
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criminal law standards that, as Chamallas persuasively recites, placed enormous
and unjustifiable obstacles in the path of victims of nonconsensual sexual
assault.74 The criminal law historically required proof of force extrinsic to the
act of intercourse as a predicate for a sexual assault crime; required proof of
utmost physical resistance or, more recently, “reasonable” resistance; and
insisted on special evidentiary requirements that applied only to rape or sexual
assault cases. This Restatement abjures all of these requirements, and simply
requires proof of nonconsent as a predicate for the tort of battery.
Moreover, our draft firmly endorses the position that “no means no.”
Consider the following hypothetical:
A and B are lying on a couch in A’s apartment after a mutually enjoyable first date. A
kisses B and expresses his desire to have sex. B says, “No, I don’t want to” but does not
physically resist intercourse, lying passively on the couch as A removes B’s clothes and
initiates intercourse.
According to our draft, A has committed a battery. This approach is arguably a
departure from that of the Second Restatement, which can be read to allow a
jury the freedom to infer actual consent or find apparent consent under such
circumstances. Although courts have thus far remained surprisingly silent in
civil cases as to whether “no means no” as a matter of law, we are proposing
that the ALI adopt the bright-line rule because it clearly tracks current cultural
and legal norms and is consistent with general tort principles governing con-
sent. Furthermore, in light of the ALI’s adoption of “no means no” in the context
of the Model Penal Code’s sexual assault provisions, we are hopeful that the ALI
will endorse our approach.
Although Chamallas lauds the adoption of a bright-line “no means no” rule,
her article urges us to propose an even more plaintiff-protective approach—
“only yes means yes,” commonly known as affirmative consent. The difference
between Chamallas’s desired approach and that taken by our draft is most
salient in scenarios in which the nonconsent of the plaintiff is less clear than
in the facts of the hypothetical above. Consider the following variations:
Variation 1: Same facts as the hypothetical above, but when A states his
desire to have sex, B is silent (rather than saying no).
Variation 2: Same facts as the hypothetical, but B passionately returns A’s
kisses. When A states his desire to have sex, B is silent, continues to return
74 As Chamallas notes, “there is now a growing appreciation for the grievous injury lack-of-
consent intercourse may cause, even absent inflictions of additional external injuries.”
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his kisses, but then lies passively on the couch when he initiates inter-
course.
Variation 3: A and B have had a relationship for months in which they
regularly engage in mutually-consensual sex. On one particular night, A
kisses B and expresses his desire to have sex. B is silent in response and is
passive when A initiates intercourse. B does not desire to engage in sex
because she is feeling ill, but she is reluctantly willing to do so (albeit
silently and passively) because she feels that satisfying the sexual desires
of her partner under these circumstances is part of a healthy relationship.
Variation 4: A and B have had a relationship for months in which they
regularly engage in mutually-consensual sex, including several instances in
which B awoke in the middle of the night to find that A had initiated
intercourse while she was asleep—a practice to which she had always
responded with behavior indicating affirmative consent.75 One night, A
and B have a heated political debate at dinner. Later that night, B awakens
to find that A has initiated intercourse. B is not subjectively willing to have
intercourse after their disagreement, but lies silent and passive throughout.
The current Restatement draft would allow a jury to decide in each of these
variations whether the plaintiff had actually consented and whether there was
apparent consent. By contrast, an affirmative consent requirement would require
liability in each variation—regardless of whether the plaintiff actually con-
sented, i. e., was willing to permit the actor’s conduct, and regardless of addi-
tional context that might lead one to conclude that the defendant had acted
reasonably based on a reasonable belief that plaintiff had actually consented.
The default rule is thus often determinative in such cases.
At the heart of Chamallas’s argument lie three concerns, each of which we
share: (1) such cases often turn solely on evidence of the plaintiff’s word versus
the defendant’s; (2) much of society has to date been predisposed to believe the
male’s (typically the defendant’s) version of the story; and (3) unwelcome sexual
conduct is a common occurrence with damaging consequences to the victim and
largely without legal consequence to the perpetrator. Chamallas suggests that
sexual assault presents a problem closely analogous to that of employment
discrimination; therefore, she believes, the sexual battery plaintiff should ben-
efit from procedural and substantive protections analogous to those provided by
75 We do not endorse the idea of retroactive consent, see § 14(d) and comment e, but the
practice of A and B might qualify as presumed consent, at least after the first instance when B
greeted A’s conduct with approval.
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civil rights statutes such as Title VII and Title IX. She further reasons that
requiring each person to obtain the affirmative consent of the other before
proceeding with sexual conduct is a small burden in light of the justice and
clarity it would bring not only in sexual battery cases, but in common day-to-day
sexual interactions.
As academics, parents, and members of society, we agree with each of the
propositions of the preceding paragraph, and we support the adoption of some
form of affirmative consent by courts or legislatures (one of us perhaps more
strongly than the other). Adopting this position in the Restatement is another
matter entirely, however. Our reasons for thus far declining to endorse affirmative
consent as an express commitment of the ALI may be summarized as follows.
Chamallas is correct in pointing out that there are few reported judicial
opinions addressing the tort standards for sexual consent, with none either
expressly rejecting or expressly adopting affirmative consent. There is, however,
fairly broad judicial consensus embracing the general principles of actual and
apparent consent, as well as the plaintiff’s burden in proving actual consent. In
our view, departing from these general principles in the Restatement—even for a
specific, underdeveloped category like sexual battery—should be justified by
sufficiently weighty countervailing norms, policies, and/or principles. Although
we personally are convinced by the normative arguments for affirmative con-
sent, at least in cases involving sexual intercourse,76 a significant proportion of
ALI members and of the general public are not. Reasonable people differ sharply
about the variations described above—even people with similar values and
political alignment.77 We believe that our approach honestly recognizes such
differences by leaving fact-sensitive, contextual consent78 decisions largely to
the jury—with the bright-line exception of “no means no”—while also encoura-
ging courts to consider adopting the alternative that Chamallas urges. This
approach protects plaintiffs in cases where nonconsent is quite clear, while
expressly recognizing that in more ambiguous cases, juries and courts must
consider where to draw the line in light of developing norms. To adopt
76 Chamallas mainly focuses on affirmative consent with respect to sexual intercourse, but
some of the sources she cites in support of her position, such as many recent student dis-
ciplinary codes, require affirmative consent with respect to any sexual contact, including a kiss.
In our view, the case for an affirmative consent requirement that extends this broadly is
considerably weaker.
77 The recent debate over allegations of sexual misconduct by comedian Aziz Ansari is
instructive on this point. See https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/aziz-ansari-sex-violating-
but-not-criminal_us_5a5e445de4b0106b7f65b346.
78 As Chamallas notes, the approach we support is similar to the contextual consent approach
that the Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault project now endorses.
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affirmative consent outright would be to take fact-sensitive consent questions
away from juries, potentially requiring plaintiff verdicts in cases in which the
norms governing intimate sexual behavior not only are unaddressed in the case
law but are deeply and reasonably contested in society.
5.2 Consent and sexual battery under ITR
The current Restatement draft79 embraces the following propositions:
(1) Actual consent consists of the mental state of willingness to permit
another’s conduct, but does not require that the consenting person desire
that the conduct take place.
(2) Actual consent may ordinarily be inferred from the circumstances.
(3) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the absence of actual
consent.
(4) Despite these general propositions, the draft suggests that courts might
reasonably decide to limit the factfinder’s ability to infer actual consent by
imposing an affirmative consent requirement for sexual intercourse.
(5) Even when actual consent is lacking, the doctrine of apparent consent
precludes liability if the defendant’s belief that the plaintiff actually con-
sented was reasonable.
(6) The defendant’s belief need not be traced to any affirmative words or
actions by the plaintiff, but may be inferred from the overall circumstances.
However, if a plaintiff expresses an objection to any sexual act, the defen-
dant cannot rely upon apparent consent.
(7) The burden of proof regarding apparent consent remains unaddressed by
the courts and, because there are viable arguments for opposing positions,
the draft leaves the matter for further judicial development.
(8) Nevertheless, the draft suggests that a jury might reasonably determine
that a defendant’s belief that the plaintiff actually consented is not reason-
able absent an expression of affirmative consent. Moreover, a court might
wish to adopt a bright-line rule of law to this effect.
Chamallas presents a detailed critique of these propositions, and we offer our
response below. We address, in turn, her critiques of the Restatement’s analysis
of actual consent and of apparent consent.
79 By “current draft,” we refer to Preliminary Draft 4. Council Draft No. 4 (which was not
available to participants in this symposium) contains revised consent provisions. Because these
provisions are still undergoing changes, we do not discuss the latter draft here.
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5.3 Chamallas’ critique of ITR’s position on actual consent
1. Mental state versus communicative notion of consent. Chamallas first criticizes
our reliance on the plaintiff’s subjective “mental state” as the basis for actual
consent, rather than looking solely to the plaintiff’s communications to the
defendant. In the Reporters’ Note to § 13, we acknowledge the philosophical
debate on this question. A full treatment of this subject is outside the scope of
this paper.80 However, the case law does not clearly support a “communica-
tive” or “performative” notion of consent.81 Courts regularly quote the
Restatement Second of Torts language that clearly provides that the plaintiff’s
willingness to permit defendant’s conduct need not be communicated to the
defendant.82 Moreover, the apparent consent provisions of the Restatement
Second also presuppose a noncommunicative conception of actual consent,
for the following reason. Apparent consent precludes liability when the defen-
dant reasonably but mistakenly believes that the plaintiff actually consented.
Several of the Restatement Second’s examples of such reasonable mistakes
involve a plaintiff who privately objects to the defendant’s conduct yet makes
no effort to communicate that objection to the defendant.83 But if actual
consent required that the defendant relied upon a communication from the
plaintiff, there would be little need for an additional apparent consent doc-
trine; courts could instead simply deny liability because of the absence of
actual consent, i. e., the absence of a communication of willingness to the
defendant. At the same time, we concede that we have found no cases whose
resolution depends on the precise question whether private, uncommunicated
consent precludes tort liability.
Nevertheless, the difference between the Restatement’s mental state
approach and a communicative approach might not be as great as Chamallas
80 One of the authors has discussed aspects of this issue in Kenneth W. Simons, Consent and
Assumption of Risk in Tort and Criminal Law, in UNRAVELLING TORT AND CRIME 336–344
(Matthew Dyson, ed., 2014).
81 Although the later portion of Chamallas’s article criticizes our reliance on the mental state
conception of consent because of its supposed tension with affirmative consent, the earlier
portion takes a different view, arguing that “affirmative consent standards … can … be inter-
preted consistently with a mental state account of consent.” We agree with the latter view.
82 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Consent … may be
manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.”).
83 See id. § 50, cmt. a, Illus. 1 (A is unwilling to be vaccinated but stands in line and holds up
her arm to B, the ship’s surgeon; B is not liable to A); and § 892, cmt. c, Illus. 3 (A proposes to
kiss B; although inwardly objecting, B says nothing and does not resist or protest by word or
gesture; A is not liable for the kiss).
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supposes. The mental state approach leaves room for a jury to find insufficient
proof of subjective consent in many cases that lack affirmative consent. And a
communicative definition of consent would still require evidence of the various
ways a plaintiff might communicate consent—verbally or through conduct.
Thus, as we discuss further below, juries in many cases would struggle with
similar questions regardless of whether consent is defined as subjective or
communicative. If that is so, then the two approaches will differ in result only
in unusual cases, such as a case in which the plaintiff showed both signs of
nonconsent during the encounter with the defendant and also signs (not
communicated to the defendant) that she might nevertheless have been sub-
jectively willing. For example, suppose the facts of Variation 1 above: The
plaintiff is silent and physically passive during intercourse. Suppose the fol-
lowing facts are also present: (1) the plaintiff had messaged her best friend
immediately before the encounter expressing her excitement about having sex
with the defendant; (2) plaintiff messaged her friend immediately after the
encounter expressing her happiness about having just had sex with defendant;
and (3) plaintiff wrote the same in her diary the next day and again two weeks
later; and (4) plaintiff first expressed the view that the conduct had not been
consensual only after the defendant ended their relationship two months later.
In such a case, a communicative notion of consent might result in a finding of
battery, because the plaintiff never communicated consent to the defendant.
Our draft, by contrast, would allow a jury to infer that the plaintiff had actually
consented.84
2. Inferring actual consent. The choice between a subjective or communica-
tive conception of consent is intertwined with another aspect of our draft with
which Chamallas takes issue: she urges us to forbid juries from inferring actual
consent in situations where affirmative consent is lacking. Chamallas very
properly points out the serious problems with permitting a jury to infer actual
consent from evidence such as a plaintiff’s allegedly provocative dress or sexual
history, a plaintiff’s choice to visit the defendant’s apartment, or the mere fact
that the plaintiff had consented to sexual acts with the defendant at some point
in the past. It is indeed troubling that society has historically taken an unrea-
listic view of such encounters, unjustly blaming the victim and often refusing to
84 For a somewhat similar example, see Larry Alexander, Heidi Hurd, & Peter Westen, Consent
does not require communication: A reply to Dougherty, 35 LAW & PHILOS. 655 (2016).
Chamallas critiques one of our illustrations in which a person confides to a friend a desire to
be kissed and then is suddenly kissed by the object of his/her desire. See § 13, Illus. 4. We agree
that the example is problematic; we will replace it with a better example of uncommunicated
consent in future drafts.
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credit the victim’s credible evidence that she did not consent to the sexual acts
in question based solely on evidence that she consented to much less intimate
interactions. Misogynistic assumptions about the prevalence of false claims by
female victims have contributed to these problems. Moreover, even if a person
sends communications to a friend indicating pleasure with the encounter,
Chamallas is surely correct that that is not always a reliable basis for inferring
consent.
It is also true, however, that social pressures might, in some cases, lead a
plaintiff subsequently to allege sexual battery even though she or he had been
subjectively willing at the time of the act. Even if Chamallas is right that a jury is
more likely to draw the inaccurate inference that plaintiff actually consented
than the inaccurate inference that plaintiff did not actually consent, her propo-
sal to forbid circumstantial evidence of actual consent would result in injustice
in certain cases.
Furthermore, even were courts to require affirmative consent, inferential
judgments would sometimes still be required. As Chamallas points out, affirma-
tive consent may be conveyed via words or conduct. Although some criminal
statutes define conduct to exclude actions extrinsic to the immediate interaction
between the plaintiff and defendant—thus narrowing the types of facts from
which an inference might be drawn—even a careful definition would not supply
perfect guidance in every case. Consider, for example, the facts of Variation 2
above—when A states his desire to have sex, B is silent, continues to return his
kisses, but then lies passively on the couch when he initiates intercourse.
Whether affirmative consent was thereby communicated might properly be a
question for the jury.
Nevertheless, Chamallas is right that we should more carefully point out in
our draft that some types of circumstantial evidence are much more fraught than
others and ought to be viewed with greater skepticism by juries. We will address
this issue in subsequent drafts.
3. Willingness versus desire. Chamallas further critiques our definition of the
requisite mental state as “willingness,” rather than “desire.”85 In our view,
between the extremes of repugnant refusal and eager desire, there lies a vast
continuum. Some points on the continuum are easily characterized as noncon-
sent—for example, assent under gunpoint—and other points may, without con-
troversy, be characterized as consent—for example, the accession of a tired, but
happily-married husband to the playful teasing of his wife that without sex she
will not explain to him how to use the remote control. Our understanding of the
85 This critique seems in tension with Chamallas’s concession that a person can give consent to
sex even though desire is lacking.
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law and of the applicable policy considerations is that the point at which
consent becomes nonconsent, although highly contextual, is closer to willing-
ness than to desire.
Men and women regularly have sex without the unconditional or enthusias-
tic “desire” to do so, but under conditions they would vehemently assert con-
stitute heartfelt consent. The facts of Variation 3 above, illustrate such an
example: Because she is feeling ill, B does not desire to have sex, but she is
willing to do so because she feels that satisfying the sexual desires of her partner
is part of a healthy relationship.
Chamallas’s primary concern seems to be the prospect of the factfinder
improperly concluding that a plaintiff consented in cases in which “willingness”
is the result of some form of duress. For example, she suggests that a plaintiff
has not consented where she finally gives in after having been “worn down by
defendant’s persistent attempts to convince her to have sex.” As the recent
debate over allegations of assault against comedian Aziz Ansari illustrate, the
specific facts and context are everything. Were the persistent attempts flowers
and smooth talk? Mere vocal urging? Vocal urging while standing imposingly in
front of the only egress from the room? Stalking and thinly-veiled threats?
Section 15 of our draft clearly provides that consent given under duress is not
actual consent. Although Comment d to § 15 states that what constitutes duress
is a highly factual inquiry, the comment is careful to point out: “Relatively mild
threats of physical, economic, or emotional harm may negate consent to sexual
conduct when such threats would not suffice to undermine consent to other
types of conduct. Tort law protects the right to decide whether to engage in
sexual conduct without fear of serious social humiliation if the person chooses
to decline.” Thus, our draft provides that subtle forms of pressure might be
determined by a jury to constitute duress even where the pressure would not
constitute duress in another context.
4. The Title VII standard of unwelcomeness. As part of her argument against
our applying common tort notions of consent to sexual battery cases, Chamallas
urges us to consider instead the concept of “unwelcomeness” that is utilized in
quid pro quo Title VII sexual harassment cases.86 In determining whether sexual
conduct amounts to harassment, a key factor is whether the plaintiff “found
particular advances unwelcome.”87 Chamallas’s invitation to adopt
86 This factor was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
87 Id. At 69.
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“unwelcomeness” as the standard for consent is parallel to her argument that
“desire” is a better standard for consent than “willingness.”88 She urges that
“unwelcomeness” ought to replace the concept of willingness, thereby placing
the victim’s perspective at the forefront in determining whether the defendant’s
otherwise tortious conduct was wrongful.
We find this analogy to be somewhat misplaced. In Vinson, the Court was
considering whether the plaintiff’s sexual encounter with her supervisor had
been coerced by the implicit threat that she would lose her job were she to
decline. The issue in Vinson is thus squarely analogous to an inquiry into
whether consent was vitiated by duress, not whether the plaintiff was, in
some superficial or minimal sense, “willing” to engage in sexual conduct
with the defendant. We concur that the perspective of the plaintiff is an
important factor in determining whether duress existed—in fact, a number
of the factors described as relevant to duress in § 15, Comment d focus on the
plaintiff’s perspective. The concept of unwelcomeness is worth including in
the Comment and corresponding Reporters’ Note expressly, however, and our
next draft will do so. Still, it is worth emphasizing that the Supreme Court
has never adopted “unwelcomeness” as sufficient to establish liability in Title
VII harrassment cases; rather, it treats unwelcomeness merely as one factor
to be considered. Indeed, as Chamallas points out, the Court in Vinson took
into account many other contextual factors that, just twenty years later, seem
problematic at best—for example, the plaintiff’s “provocative speech or
dress.”89 In our view, the Court’s approach in such cases is not a model for
emulation.
However, we do acknowledge Chamallas’s larger point: evolving stan-
dards for consent to sexual conduct properly place significant emphasis on
the victim’s perspective, an emphasis that is much greater than was the case
with traditional rape and sexual assault offenses. At the same time, we
believe that the Restatement Third’s recognition that “No means no,” and
the flexibility of the reasonable person component of the apparent consent
doctrine, are quite consistent with this more balanced approach, which
carefully considers the rights and interests of both parties to a sexual
encounter.
5. Burden of proof. Chamallas asserts that our placing the burden of proof
regarding actual consent on the plaintiff represents a departure from the Second
Restatement. This is not accurate. As § 12, Comment e of our draft explain, both
the First and Second Restatements expressly placed the burden to prove lack of
88 In fact, Microsoft Word’s first-listed synonym for “unwelcome” is “undesirable.”
89 Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
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consent on the plaintiff.90 In the face of a clear majority of cases placing the
burden to prove lack of consent on the plaintiff, and in the absence of any
holding to the contrary in the context of sexual battery, it is appropriate to report
this position as the law. Moreover, the principle that a plaintiff has the burden to
prove that the defendant has violated a protected interest and has wronged the
plaintiff is ubiquitous in tort law. Since a consented-to sexual contact does not
violate a protected interest, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove a lack of
consent is a natural application of the general principle.
Nevertheless, in the comments to § 12, we explain that particularly in light of
evidence “of the widespread incidence of sexual assault that does not result in
criminal or tort liability,” courts might reasonably consider shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant in sexual battery cases. Chamallas criticizes us for not
offering a more full-throated endorsement of this alternative, and perhaps
rightly so. On the other hand, we have received a number of comments from
other ALI members urging us instead not only to retain our more neutral tone,
but also to relegate our comments to the Reporters’ Notes. This issue squarely
presents the fundamental and difficult question of the proper role of a
Restatement (as does much of our response to Chamallas’s article). Reasonable
people may differ about the extent to which a Restatement should capture
current precedent, should extrapolate from current trends, should endorse exist-
ing doctrine as sound, or should assure that a specific doctrine is consistent with
other tort doctrines and principles. And the reasonable people who comprise the
membership of the ALI will undoubtedly ponder these questions about a
Restatement’s role when they discuss the burden of proof in sexual battery
cases as this project proceeds through the ALI’s democratic process.
6. The role of a Restatement in changing social norms. Another dividing line
between Chamallas’s argument for affirmative consent and the position of the
Restatement draft concerns how to understand tort law’s purposes and its role in
maintaining or changing social norms. There is much debate in the scholarly
literature about whether tort law is a forward-looking instrument of deterrence
or a retrospective practice of corrective justice or civil recourse. But there is also
a debate about the norms that tort law should induce compliance with and
about the norms whose violation tort law should correct. Should courts take a
more conservative role of fostering existing norms, or should they attempt to
change behavioral norms? It is not the proper role of a Restatement, most would
agree, to attempt a dramatic shift in social norms. Although achieving desirable
90 Comment e cites RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10, cmt. c and § 13, cmt. d (AM. LAW
INST. 1965), and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 13(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
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social policy is certainly a factor to be considered in restating the law, it cannot
be the driving force.
7. The theft analogy. One of Chamallas’s arguments in favor of affirmative
consent is that the law should afford a woman’s right to avoid sex the same
protection that it affords interests in property and other forms of personal
injury. She cites Susan Estrich in noting that “the law does not regard a
victim as consenting to robbery when the assailant pins her down, strides
atop her, and steals her wallet, even if the victim fails to yell ‘stop.’” There is
a considerable practical difference, however, in the frequency with which a
person consensually, as opposed to nonconsensually, gives up sexual rights
and the frequency with which a person similarly gives up the right to his or
her wallet or the right not to be punched in the nose. No matter the
prevalence of sexual assault, consensual sex is surely the norm. By contrast,
it is exceedingly rare that one gives away one’s wallet or is willing to be
punched in the nose. The difference in default interactions does not, of
course, justify a presumption of consent in one situation and not the other
—and the Restatement’s approach does not create such a presumption.
Rather, except for cases in which the plaintiff communicated nonconsent,
our draft leaves such questions to the jury.
5.4 Chamallas’ critique of ITR’s position on apparent consent
Section 15 of our draft states that even in the absence of actual consent, the
doctrine of “apparent consent” precludes liability where the defendant’s belief
that the plaintiff actually consented was reasonable. The defendant’s belief need
not be traced to any affirmative words or actions by the plaintiff but may be
inferred from the overall circumstances. If a plaintiff expresses an objection to
any sexual act, however, the defendant cannot rely upon apparent consent: our
draft recognizes a bright-line rule by which a “no means no” as a matter of law.
Chamallas objects to our treatment of apparent consent in several respects. We
address each in turn.
1. Plaintiff’s versus defendant’s perspective. Chamallas urges us to abandon
altogether the principle of apparent consent in the context of sexual battery. She
argues that because apparent consent turns on a defendant’s reasonable belief
regarding the plaintiff’s consent, the plaintiff’s perspective is necessarily
excluded altogether. To focus on the defendant’s reasonableness, Chamallas
asserts, is thus to negate the plaintiff’s experience of violation. Furthermore,
because society’s norms have long been dominated by a male perspective that
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privileges a man’s access to sex, judges and juries often inaccurately interpret a
woman’s actions as inviting or acceding to a man’s sexual advances.
We agree with Chamallas’s point that applying apparent consent criteria
without any qualification is problematic in the sexual context. Our draft thus
suggests that a court might plausibly create the following bright-line rule: the
belief held by an actor that the plaintiff consents does not count as reasonable
unless the plaintiff has affirmatively expressed willingness to the actor. We can
certainly do a better job in explaining the various reasons for this suggestion,
and Chamallas’s draft will prove useful in that regard.
Once again, however, reasonable minds may differ regarding the meaning
and application of apparent consent in sexual battery cases. Many ALI members
and members of the general public believe that some form of apparent consent
ought to shield a defendant from liability in sexual battery cases. The argument
is as follows:
In an apparent consent scenario, the defendant has made a mistake in
believing that the defendant has actually consented.91 A decision to allow a
defendant to avoid liability in such circumstances rests on the following propo-
sitions: (1) a consented-to battery is not a battery at all, because the plaintiff’s
interest has not been violated and the plaintiff has not been wronged; (2) if a
defendant reasonably believes that a plaintiff has consented, the defendant is
not sufficiently culpable to be liable for battery. An affirmative expression of
unwillingness by the plaintiff should, of course, suffice to establish that the
defendant did not reasonably believe that plaintiff consented, just as an affir-
mative expression of willingness ordinarily suffices to establish that defendant’s
belief was reasonable. Even absent an affirmative expression of willingness,
however, circumstances might lead a defendant reasonably to believe that a
plaintiff had consented to the defendant’s actions. This is particularly so in light
of the common occurrence of consensual sexual interactions in which neither
party affirmatively expresses consent. Any bright-line affirmative consent
requirement would thus fail to reflect existing community standards.
Moreover, were such a requirement internalized over time, romance and spon-
taneity would be seriously undermined, especially if affirmative consent is
required at each stage of every sexual interaction.
We disagree with the more dire predictions by opponents of an affirmative
consent requirement regarding the deleterious effect of such a requirement on
daily behavior. However, the arguments of affirmative consent’s opponents are
91 “Apparent consent” is a potentially misleading term for what is really a mistake doctrine. In
fact, we are considering changing the Title of § 16 to “Reasonable Mistake About Consent” in the
next draft.
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strong enough that without any support in the case law, we do not feel that a
stronger endorsement by the ALI is defensible.
2. Proof difficulties. At the center of Chamallas’s argument against apparent
consent and in favor of affirmative consent are issues of proof and policy. She
points out that typically the only available evidence in such cases is the
plaintiff’s word against the defendant’s. Paired with society’s inherent skepti-
cism regarding a woman’s assertions of sexual assault, this fact makes it easy to
see why the typical sexual assault—even against a wealthy defendant—might
not even result in a tort claim. In addition, she points to considerable evidence
that sexual assault is rampant in our society, particularly on college campuses.
Chamallas suggests that abrogating apparent consent and adopting an affirma-
tive consent rule are necessary to overcome the crippling obstacles facing
plaintiffs in this context. In a case of ambiguity with regard to what happened
or whether what happened crossed the line into nonconsent, Chamallas urges
that tort doctrine ought to err on the side of protecting the non-initiator, most
commonly a woman.
As an additional protection—and regardless of whether the Restatement
were to adopt her other suggestions—Chamallas urges us to place the burden
of proof regarding apparent consent on the defendant. It is our personal view
that the burden should indeed fall on the defendant, for three reasons. First,
particularly when the plaintiff testifies that there was not actual consent, appar-
ent consent is most analogous to an affirmative defense, the burden of which is
typically carried by the defendant. Second, apparent consent is an argument
asserting a mistake on the part of the defendant, and the defendant has the best
access to evidence relevant to its proof. Third, as a policy matter, if the plaintiff
testifies that she or he did not actually consent, this should present a hurdle for
the defendant to overcome. Thus, if a jury can’t decide whether the defendant’s
belief was reasonable, the plaintiff should succeed in collecting damages.
Our draft sets out some of these arguments, but takes no official position on
the question for two familiar reasons—the cases do not address the question one
way or the other, and there are reasonable arguments pointing the other way
(including the virtue of simplicity in treating the burden of proof for all consent
issues in the same manner). Chamallas’s arguments provide good reason to
rethink this issue, however.
3. The relevance of the criminal law. Chamallas makes much of the fact that
at several points in our draft, we point out similarities between our approach
and that of the criminal law in a majority of states. She urges us that the
approach in criminal cases should not dictate the analysis of civil claims. In
short, we agree. As Chamallas explains, employing a pro-victim conception of
consent in the criminal law raises distinctive concerns about
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overcriminalization, including triggering lifelong sex offender status for those
convicted of sexual assault crimes, and about imposing harsh legal sanctions
disproportionately on poor and minority defendants. Moreover, she persuasively
argues that because many states still impose force and physical resistance
requirements for a criminal conviction, a civil court should not feel bound to
follow the approach to consent adopted in the state’s criminal sexual assault
cases.
At the same time, however, the approach taken in criminal cases is not
irrelevant, either to a court deciding a civil sexual battery claim or to the
Restatement project. How courts decide analogous criminal cases is some indi-
cation of society’s cultural norms on the question—much as the evidence
Chamallas cites regarding the widespread adoption of affirmative consent in
university conduct codes is indeed some evidence of these norms. This is the
spirit in which our draft cites criminal statutes and case law, and we will
endeavor to make that clearer in our Reporters’ Notes. We will also make greater
reference to the content of university conduct codes. For example, as Chamallas
emphasizes, many of these codes require that consent be ongoing during a
sexual interaction and that the parties should have the power to revoke consent
at any time. These requirements are implicit in the Restatement draft, but it
might well be helpful to make them explicit.
5.5 Conclusion
In this reply, we have focused on areas of potential disagreement with Professor
Chamallas, especially the question whether the Restatement Third should
unequivocally endorse an affirmative consent standard. But we have also
noted the many points of agreement that we share. Beyond the points already
described above, we concur in Chamallas’ view that tort law can play an
important function in empowering victims of sexual assault, by permitting the
victim to decide whether or not to pursue a tort claim. We also agree that tort
law has an advantage over criminal law insofar as tort remedies are individua-
lized to the harm suffered by the plaintiff. By contrast, criminal law has to make
difficult decisions in determining whether to classify different instances of
nonconsensual sexual conduct as misdemeanors, or as felonies of one or
another grade, based on such factors as the use of extrinsic force or whether
the conduct involved penetration.
We plan to incorporate many of these and other important points of agree-
ment in future drafts.
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6 Reply to Bernstein
Anita Bernstein, in her eloquent and provocative article, “Rape as Trespass,”
provides a creative and original framework for considering the harms and evils
that women suffer because of the persistent threat of rape. Women’s awareness
of the background risk of rape has enormous consequences for their lives, she
persuasively argues, ranging from direct medical and economic costs to the
disincentive to participate fully in the work force (whether the work is agricul-
tural, military, or journalistic). Moreover, there are equally pervasive but more
subtle disruptions and costs, such as the difficulty of developing healthy rela-
tionships when women must be constantly vigilant about potential threats. “In
sum,” Bernstein explains, “even when individuals are not themselves experien-
cing unwanted sexual penetration, rape pervades ordinary life in the contem-
porary United States. It breaches the peace even when none of the elements of
this crime occur.”
In the portions of her article most relevant to the Intentional Torts Restatement,
Bernstein carefully traces the conceptual roots of assault, battery, and false impri-
sonment in the ancient writ of trespass. She argues that these torts, like their
property analogues, involve an unlicensed “possession” of one’s person and there-
fore should be accorded similar protections. Professor Bernstein asserts that this
understanding is particularly important in the context of rape, for it ensures that the
law both guarantees victims the right to deadly means of self-defense and accords
them proper recognition of the invasive nature of such violations.
In one sense, we do not have a substantial reply to Professor Bernstein. We
agree with her historical description, while recognizing also that the law has
long abandoned both the writ of trespass and all usage of the language of
trespass in the context of invasions to one’s person. In fact, Professor
Bernstein admits that her purposes are not to influence any significant change
in our draft. She states that rape “falls uncontroversially under the current
blackletter prohibition of ‘contact [that] is offensive to a reasonable sense of
personal dignity.’” (We would add that many rapes would also constitute battery
resulting in physical injury and some would constitute false imprisonment as
well, if the defendant physically holds down the victim and prevents her or him
from escaping.) With regard to our draft, Professor Bernstein suggests merely
that we add in the Reporters’ Notes some acknowledgement of the pedigree of
the torts we restate and also their common ancestry with the torts of trespass to
land and trespass to chattels. We will happily do so.
Bernstein also makes the important point that tort law recognize a person’s
absolute dominion over the body, with a corresponding absolute right to
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“exclude” another for any reason. As Bernstein explains: “As a self-possessor,
she may refuse access to her body … for good reason, for no reason, and out of a
motive of which she might be or ought to be ashamed: snobbery, prejudice,
distraction, laziness, meanness, baseless resentment.” Contemporary tort law
recognizes, in the tort of battery, a person’s right to exclude another from
making physical contact with the person’s body unless the person has granted
consent (or has a privilege such as self-defense). And that consent may be
granted or denied for any reason, idiosyncratic or otherwise. A doctor may not
even act to save a patient’s life if the patient refuses consent to the treatment.
The law thus elevates the autonomy of the individual over otherwise compelling
social interests, except in extremely limited circumstances.
We would like to address a few points in Professor Bernstein’s piece insofar
as they relate to our work on self-defense and defense of property, the subject of
our upcoming Restatement draft. First, we offer a response to Professor
Bernstein’s assertion that one ought to enjoy the same privilege to use deadly
force as a means to defend against rape that a property owner enjoys to defend
her personal or real property. Our draft does indeed provide parallel protection,
although not in quite the manner described in Professor Bernstein’s article.
Professor Bernstein first asserts that a person in her or his home may kill
an intruder even in the absence of any threat of serious bodily injury. This does
not accurately state the law in most jurisdictions, and it is neither the position
of the Second Restatement nor of our current draft. Rather, a person’s privilege
to use deadly force in defense of property is coextensive with the privilege of
self-defense: if and only if the intruder poses a threat of death or serious bodily
harm to someone on the property, the landowner may use deadly force in
response.92 The Restatement Second makes only one distinction in this regard:
in the context of self-defense, the danger to the defendant must be immedi-
ate,93 but immediacy is not required if one is acting in defense of property. We
find neither support for this distinction in the case law nor any sufficiently
compelling policy reason for maintaining it; thus, our future drafts will abro-
gate the distinction, requiring proof of immediate danger even in defense of
property scenarios.
Professor Bernstein also asserts that the Second Restatement does not
require a threatened person to flee before using deadly force in self-defense,
regardless of whether one is in one’s home. This statement is accurate with
regard to a person’s dwelling: one may kill an intruder into one’s dwelling who
threatens death, serious bodily harm, or “ravishment” even where safe retreat is
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 79 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
93 Id. at § 65.
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available.94 The statement is not accurate, however, outside of one’s dwelling:
there, an actor may not use deadly force if the actor can “with complete safety
avoid the necessity of so defending himself by retreating.”95 To be sure, several
states have adopted “stand-your-ground” statutes, broadly protecting a right to
use deadly force without retreat. Only about a third of these statutes apply to tort
actions, however, and only four of those extend the right beyond the defense of
one’s home.96
Finally, Professor Bernstein’s interpretation of rape as a form of trespass has
an intriguing implication: it might militate against the application of apparent
consent to sexual battery, contrary to the position of the Third Restatement, for
the following reason. In a case involving trespass to land, she points out, a
defendant would be subject to liability even if the defendant had a mistaken
belief that the landowner had granted access to the property. Similarly, one
might think, a defendant should be subject to liability for sexual battery even if
the defendant had a mistaken belief that the plaintiff had granted permission for
sexual intimacy.
Bernstein is correct about trespass to land not permitting a defense of (even
reasonable) mistake about consent to use the property, but we should also
remember that this doctrine contains a rather important exception: if the mis-
take is traceable to actions by the landowner, then the alleged trespasser is not
liable. This exception is largely consistent with how our current draft treats
apparent consent. When a defendant asserts apparent consent, the defendant
typically claims that some actions by the plaintiff led defendant to believe that
the plaintiff actually consented to the battery, assault, or false imprisonment.
Thus, even if it is generally true that mistake about consent should receive the
same treatment in sexual battery as in trespass to land, it does not follow that all
instances of such a mistake should result in liability. To be sure, the current
Third Restatement draft takes the position that an actor’s reasonable belief that
the plaintiff actually consents need not be traced to the plaintiff’s actions.
Accordingly, the exception noted above is not consistent with the draft’s treat-
ment of apparent consent in all cases.
This analysis does raise the question whether the draft’s position should be
reconsidered as applied to sexual battery, as opposed to other intentional torts
to persons. In this specific context, perhaps an actor should be precluded from
relying on reasonable mistake with respect to a plaintiff’s actual consent unless
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 The four states are Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina and Utah. See, e. g., Skinner v.
Bevans, 116 So.3d 1147, 1152 (Ala. Civ. App., 2012).
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the source of the mistake is the plaintiff’s own words or conduct. Generalizations
about what is customarily expected in the way of sexual consent should argu-
ably not be a sufficient basis for judging a mistake about actual consent to be
reasonable, absent specific words or conduct by the plaintiff that are the basis of
the mistake. This is an issue that we will carefully consider as we move forward
with the project.
A last question remains: is Bernstein’s analogy between trespass and rape
valid? At the level of doctrine, the analogy remains problematic. Trespass is a
different kind of intentional tort than battery: although the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant intended to enter the property in question, the defendant is
liable without regard to whether the defendant knew or should have known that
the land was owned by the plaintiff. In this sense, trespass contains an element
of strict liability. By contrast, battery does not contain an analogous strict
liability element. (At the same time, however, the single intent version of battery
endorsed by ITR requires a less culpable type of intent than the dual intent
version, which requires intent to harm or offend as well as an intent to contact.)
Some might not approve of the fact that property rights command more protec-
tion in this sense than rights to physical inviolability (and we agree that this
distinction might be questioned), but this indeed is the law.
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